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INTRODUCTION
The past year has witnessed the greatest economic meltdown since the
Great Depression. Institutions that have been household names have
* William H. Rehnquist Professor of Law, Pepperdine University; Professor of Law Emeritus,
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disappeared or de facto nationalized. As this paper is being written in the
summer of 2009, the credit and stock markets have stabilized. However,
most of the other economic news continues to be negative. The national
unemployment rate is close to double digits and still climbing.' Several of
our largest states passed that mark months earlier.2 Foreclosures continue at
high levels.' Welfare rolls are rising. State governments are strapped for
cash and many are drastically cutting services.
At the core of this crisis is the mortgage meltdown. As a long-time
mortgage law teacher, the past year has been perplexing, depressing and, at
times, oddly exhilarating. Our subject matter, for good and ill, has clearly
been at the heart of the American and world-wide economy. Just two or
three years ago, I extolled to my classes the virtues of the secondary market
for mortgages-how investors from all over the world were helping to
finance home ownership in this country and elsewhere by purchasing
mortgage-backed bonds secured by pools of home mortgages. Moreover, as
Federal Reserve policy encouraged low interest rates, housing prices
soared, homeowners withdrew this newly created equity by refinancing and
1. News from the Jobs Front, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2009, at A20 (noting that the May 2009
national unemployment rate rose to 9.4% and concluding that "[b]arring an economic miracle,
unemployment will hit and probably surpass 10 percent this year"); see also Floyd Norris, U.S.
Jobless Rate Likely to Pass Europe's, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2009, at B3.
2. See Justin Lahart & Erica Alini, Unemployment Rate Rises in 48 States, WALL ST. J., June
20, 2009, at A2 ("In 16 states and the District of Columbia, the unemployment rate topped the
nation's 9.4% .... ); California Led in Job Losses in April, Cutting 63,700, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,2009, at B2 (noting that for April 2009, the states with the highest unemployment rates are
California, Michigan, Oregon, South Carolina and Rhode Island, all with rates eleven percent or
higher).
3. Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, Unemployment Vexes Foreclosure Plan, WALL ST. J., June
26, 2009, at A4 ("Rising unemployment is complicating the ... effort to reduce foreclosures and
stabilize the housing market."); Editorial, Foreclosures: No End in Sight, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009,
at A22 ("A continuing steep drop in home prices combined with rising unemployment is powering a
new wave of foreclosures."); Peter S. Goodman & Jack Healy, Work Losses Hit Mortgages Seen as
Safe, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2009, at Al ("With many economists anticipating that the unemployment
rate will rise into the double digits from its current 8.9%, foreclosures are expected to accelerate.").
4. Sara Murray, Numbers on Welfare See Sharp Increase, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2009, at Al.
5. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
6. See Scott E. Harrington, Moral Hazard and the Meltdown, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2009, at A9("The Federal Reserve played a key role in making these bets [on housing speculation and on taking
out second mortgages] attractive to borrowers, lenders and investors. It kept interest rates at
historically low levels until it was too late to prevent the eventual implosion. This deliberate policy
and public statements by then Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan fueled demand for credit and housing
and encouraged lenders to relax mortgage-lending criteria."); John B. Taylor, How Government
Created the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A19 (criticizing the Federal Reserve for
keeping interest rates below known monetary guidelines which resulted in the housing boom and
bust); Justin Fox, Blame Them, TIME, Jan. 12, 2009, at 43 ("[l]f the Fed is going to step in to prevent
panics, it needs to do more to deflate the bubbles that inevitably precede those panics.").
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thus found themselves newly enriched.7 The prosperity seemed like it would
never end.
At the core of this prosperity were mortgages that did not meet
traditional credit standards. Sub-prime mortgages were packaged and sold
as investment grade bonds to investors. These transactions were enabled by
ratings agencies and investment banks which were mysteriously able to
attach their seal of approval to these securities.8 Everyone was betting on
the continuing rise in real estate values. Then the bubble burst,9 the
economy tanked,'o and the world continues to experience the negative
externalities.
The financial cost of just the mortgage meltdown segment of the
economic collapse for the federal government has been nothing short of
breathtaking. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the world's largest secondary
7. See Harrington, supra note 6, at A9 ("On the demand side, many subprime borrowers
acquired properties with little or no money down. They faced relatively little loss if housing prices
fell and they defaulted. Many people took cheap mortgages on investment property to speculate on
housing-price increases. Others took cheap second mortgages to fund current consumption."); Peter
Coy, Lessons from the Front, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 27, 2009, at 30-31 (referencing Hyun Song Shin
from Princeton University, "The financial crisis arose, in large part, because companies and
households borrowed too much."); Greg Ip et al., Housing Bust Fuels Blame Game - Democrats
Seize on Opponents'Role; Bipartisan Failures, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2008, at Al ("Politicians of
all stripes cheered on the lower interest rates that sparked the boom in housing and excesses in
credit."); Fox, supra note 6, at 43 ("None of this would have happened if millions of us hadn't come
to believe we could get something for nothing by taking on debts we couldn't repay.").
8. See The Wages of Sin, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2009, at 80-81 ("By misreading the risk in
mortgage-backed securities and other 'structured' products, the rating agencies Standard & Poor's,
Moody's and Fitch played starring roles in the failure of finance."); Taylor, supra note 6, at A19
("The effects of the boom and bust were amplified by several complicating factors including the use
of subprime and adjustable-rate mortgages, which led to excessive risk taking.... Delinquency rates
and foreclosure rates are inversely related to housing price inflation. These rates declined rapidly
during the years housing prices rose rapidly, likely throwing mortgage underwriting programs off
track and misleading many people. Adjustable-rate, subprime and other mortgages were packed into
mortgage-backed securities of great complexity. Rating agencies underestimated the risk of these
securities, either because of a lack of competition, poor accountability, or most likely the inherent
difficulty in assessing risk due to the complexity.").
9. Steven Gjerstad & Vernon L. Smith, From Bubble to Depression?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6,
2009, at A15 ("Both the Clinton and Bush administrations aggressively pursued the goal of
expanding homeownership, so credit standards eroded. Lenders and the investment banks that
securitized mortgages used rising home prices to justify loans to buyers with limited assets and
income. Rating agencies accepted the hypothesis of ever rising home values, gave large portions of
each security issue an investment-grade rating, and investors gobbled them up.... The price decline
started in 2006. Then policies designed to promote the American dream instead produced a
nightmare. Trillions of dollars of mortgages, written to buyers with slender equity, started a wave of
delinquencies and defaults.").
10. Id. ("Borrowers' losses were limited to their small down payments; hence, the lion's share of
the losses was transmitted into the financial system and it collapsed.").
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market purchasers and securitizers of residential mortgages have failed and
became wards of the federal government in 2008." The cost of this
nationalization to the taxpayers is now almost one hundred billion dollars
and rising. 12 The U.S. Department of Treasury's Public-Private Investment
Program (PPIP) is devoting an initial five hundred billion dollars to
purchasing toxic mortgage-backed securities to remove them from the books
of major financial institutions.13 As one commentator described PPIP:
In the event the securities end up worthless, private investors lose
their money, but the bulk of the risk is borne by the government. If
the securities hold their value or increase, on the other hand, the
system is set up so that private investors get the majority of the
gains, even though they put up only a minority of the money.14
In addition, the "Making Home Affordable" program announced by the
Treasury in early 2009 is aimed at using federal subsidies of up to seventy-
five billion dollars to modify millions of home loans." While the final price
tag for these and other federal programs is yet to be determined, it would
hardly be surprising if it wound up being over a trillion dollars.
Ultimately, of course, billions of dollars worth of mortgages held
directly or indirectly by the federal government will have to be foreclosed.
Under our federal system, those foreclosures must be under state law.
While many states authorize a variety of nonjudicial or power of sale
foreclosure procedures that are relatively efficient and fair, about forty
percent of the states still use judicial foreclosure, a process that is costly,
time-consuming and inefficient.'7  The functioning of judicial foreclosure
during the current crisis in Florida can only be described as "surreal" or
"Dickensian." In February 2009, Lee County, Florida's foreclosure docket
consisted of 24,000 cases (as opposed to a normal caseload of 1900)."
According to one journalist's description:
11. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
13. James B. Stewart, Benefit from the Bailout, SMART MONEY, July 2009, at 30, 30.
14. Id.
15. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable: Updated
Detailed Program Description (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/housingfact sheet.pdf.
16. See generally I GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7(5th ed. 2007).
17. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
18. Michael Corkery, A Florida Court's 'Rocket Docket' Blasts Through Foreclosure Cases,WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at Al.
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During a break in the [judicial] hearing, lawyers used dollies to
wheel in boxes containing hundreds of case files, which they piled
onto tables and on the floor. One lawyer ... ran between the
judge's bench and the dozens of open boxes on the floor. His
colleagues sat cross-legged on the courtroom floor, sorting through
the files. 9
State law governing security interests in rents in commercial mortgage
transactions is also complex, conflicting and confusing.20 When the current
crisis hits commercial real estate and commercial mortgage-backed
securities, federal bankruptcy courts will pay the price for this lack of
uniformity.
It seems almost bizarre that a federal government that is largely footing
this enormous bill for resolving the mortgage crisis should be subjected to
this arcane, if quaint, state foreclosure procedure. While this patchwork
system seems questionable in normal economic times, it clearly is
unjustifiable in the present circumstances. This paper advocates
congressional adoption of nonjudicial mortgage foreclosure both as to real
estate and the rents it produces.21 If such a pervasive approach is politically
unrealistic, it advocates federalization when federal agencies foreclose or
when security interests in rents are being enforced in bankruptcy courts.22 It
also suggests, but does not yet directly advocate, that it may be time for
federal preemption of state anti-deficiency legislation.23
A. State Law Divergence: An Overview
"Uniform" is hardly a word one would appropriately use to describe the
current law of real estate finance law. Mortgage law varies substantially
from state to state and represents an often perplexing amalgam of English
legal history, common law, and legislation.24 This is the reality despite
numerous attempts during the past century to achieve greater uniformity, and
19. Id. A similar caseload crisis exists in Miami-Dade County, Florida. During 2008, a total of
56,656 cases were filed. See Mortgage Foreclosure Filing Statistics, http://www.miami-
dadeclerk.com/dadecoc/Mortgage-Statics.asp (last visited May 27, 2009). In 2005, before the
mortgage crisis, the total was 7829. Id.
20. See infra notes 47-61, 194-96 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 140-92 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
24. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 6-7.
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even though the mortgage market is both national and international in scope
and is a driving force in the nation's economy.25
This disarray is especially the case with respect to mortgage foreclosure.
In about forty percent of the states, mortgages may be foreclosed only by ajudicial action.26 A typical judicial foreclosure entails a long series of steps:
filing of a foreclosure complaint and lis pendens notice; service of process
on all parties whose interests may be prejudiced by the proceeding; a
hearing, frequently by a master in chancery who then reports to the court;
the decree or judgment; the notice of sale; a public foreclosure sale, usually
conducted by a sheriff; post-sale adjudication as to the disposition of the
foreclosure proceeds; and, if appropriate, the entry of a deficiencyjudgment.27 In some cases, an appeal may follow. In a contested judicial
foreclosure, delay is endemic, and the result is a time-consuming and costly
process.28
The remaining states utilize "power of sale" foreclosure, a nonjudicial
process that is substantially less complicated and costly than its judicial
counterpart. 2 9  After varying degrees of notice, the mortgaged property is
sold at a public sale by a disinterested third party, such as a sheriff or a
25. See generally UNIF. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT §§ 101-703, 14 U.L.A. 131 (2005).
26. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 806. Much of the text and notes in the following
three sections of this paper are derived from Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming
Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399 (2004) [hereinafter
Reforming Foreclosure]. For a comprehensive classification of states as to their use of judicial or
power of sale foreclosure, see Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential
Mortgage Default: Theory and Evidence from U.S. States 41-52 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond,
Working Paper No. 09-10, 2009), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/
working papers/2009/pdf/wp09- I Opdf.
27. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 807-08.
28. As the Conference stated:
The delays and inefficiency associated with foreclosure by judicial action are costly.
They increase the risks of vandalism, fire, loss, depreciation, damage, and waste. The
resulting costs raise the prices of private mortgages and erode the economic value of
government subsidy programs involving mortgages. They add to the portfolio of
foreclosed properties held by lenders, secondary mortgage market investors, and
government insurers and guarantors of mortgages.
UNIF. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 124.
29. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 845. According to a paper by Karen M. Pence,
Judicial procedures are substantially more time-consuming than power of sale
procedures. Wood (1997) finds that judicial foreclosures, on average, take 148 days
longer than nonjudicial foreclosures, while Freddie Mac's guidelines for mortgage
servicers indicate that foreclosures in the most time-consuming state, Maine (a judicial
foreclosure state), take almost 300 days longer than in the quickest state, Texas (a power-
of-sale state).
Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit 5 (Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve, Working Paper No. 2003-16, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/pubs/feds/2003/200316/200316pap.pdf.
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trustee, or by the mortgagee.30 Because this process does not normally entail
a hearing, it frequently is consummated in a matter of four to eight months.
In almost half of the states the foreclosure sale is not the end of the road
for the borrower. A concept commonly termed "statutory redemption"
allows the mortgagor-debtor and, in many instances, junior lienholders, up to
a year or longer to regain title after the foreclosure sale by paying the
foreclosure purchaser the sale price plus accrued interest and other
expenses.32 In the vast majority of these states, the mortgagor will have the
right to remain in possession during this post-foreclosure period.33 Statutory
redemption may be available in both judicial and power of sale foreclosure;
although some states do not authorize it in the power of sale setting.34
Proponents praise statutory redemption as "allowing time for the mortgagor
to refinance and save his property, permitting additional use of the property
by the hard-pressed mortgagor, and probably most important, encouraging
those who do bid at the sale to bid in at a fair price."3 For an increasing
number of critics, statutory redemption is counterproductive because the fact
that a foreclosure purchaser acquires a defeasible title probably suppresses
bidding and results in lower sale prices. 6
Perhaps most troubling is the varied state law treatment of borrower
personal liability and post-foreclosure deficiency judgments. In the
substantial majority of states, a mortgage lender may first obtain a judgment
for the amount of the obligation and seek to collect it by enforcing it against
the borrower's other assets. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in this
manner, the lender can foreclose on the mortgaged real estate for the
balance. 8 Alternatively, the lender may foreclose first and sue for a
deficiency judgment after the foreclosure sale.39  The amount of this
deficiency judgment is traditionally the difference between the foreclosure
sale price and the mortgage debt.40
30. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 845.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 977-78.
33. Id. at 978.
34. Id.
35. Darryl A. Hart, Comment, The Statutory Right to Redemption in California, 52 CAL. L. REV.
846, 848 (1964).
36. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 980.
37. Id. at 931-32; RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.2 cmt. a (1997).
38. Grant S. Nelson, Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosure in Missouri: Some
Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REV. 151, 152 (1982).
39. Id.
40. Id.
589
However, several states reject this common law solution, adopting
instead a "one-action" approach that requires the lender to use the second
option mentioned above-the lender must first foreclose, and a deficiency
judgment may be obtained only incident to the foreclosure proceeding.4' A
few states go further and simply prohibit any borrower personal liability on
purchase-money mortgage obligations 42 or after power of sale foreclosures. 43
In that setting, the mortgage obligation is simply "non-recourse" as a matter
of law. Even where deficiency judgments are permitted, some states use
"fair value" legislation to limit the deficiency to the difference between the
mortgage debt and the fair value of the foreclosed real estate, rather than the
difference between the debt and the foreclosure sale price." Moreover, in
these states, the protections of these statutes may not be waived by
mortgagors either ex ante or after default.45
In sum, this area of mortgage law is a mosaic of divergence. While, at
one extreme, some states impose virtually no limitation on deficiency
judgments and personal liability, the polar opposite is represented by
California 4 6 and a few other states where personal recourse against a
borrower is nearly always unavailable. Other states fall somewhere in
between these doctrinal poles.
The law governing security interests in rents is yet another example of
substantial and confusing variance in state approaches. Lenders on
commercial and multi-family real estate not only demand a mortgage on the
land and its physical improvements ("bricks and mortar"), but also a valid
security interest in the rents produced by the real estate. While rents are
41. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West 1980); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-101 (2004);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.430 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 79B-
6-901 (2008).
42. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, LAND TRANSACTIONS AND FINANCE 633 (4th ed.
2004) (defining a purchase-money mortgage as "a mortgage taken by a lender, who may be either a
vendor or a third party, to finance the mortgagor's acquisition of the mortgaged real estate").
43. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-729(A) (2007) (prohibiting deficiency judgments on
purchase-money mortgages); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1980) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 45-21.38 (2008) (same). Many states prohibit deficiency judgments after power of sale
foreclosure. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-814(E) (2002);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 1980).
44. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West 1980); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1371
(McKinney 2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8103(c) (West 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-47-
16 (2009); TEX. CODE ANN. §§ 51.004-51.005 (Vernon 2009); 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note
16, at 968. The statutes use a variety of terms to define the "value" of the property for purposes of a
deficiency judgment, including "fair value," "true value," "true market value," "reasonable value,"
"appraised value," "actual value," and "market value." See I NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16,
at 943 n.6.
45. See, e.g., Deberard Props., Ltd. v. Lim, 976 P.2d 843 (Cal. 1999); Cadle Co. II v. Harvey,
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150 (Ct. App. 2000).
46. See I NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 667-88. For a detailed classification of
mortgagor personal liability for all the states, see Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26, at 41-52.
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deemed to be "real estate" and an assignment (mortgage) of them is
enforceable in every jurisdiction, there the unanimity ends. Substantial
disagreement among the states exists as to when such assignments become
effective between the two parties, when they become "perfected" against
third parties, and at what point the mortgagee acquires the actual right to
commence collection of the rents.
Some jurisdictions recognize the validity of so-called "absolute
assignments" in situations where the language of the assignment is
sufficiently sweeping. In such an assignment, the mortgagee is deemed to
obtain a present title to rents even though the assignment itself postpones the
right to collect until the mortgagor defaults.47 Under this approach, the
mortgagee obtains "present title" when the assignment is executed, it is
perfected upon recording and, as one court explained, "operates to transfer
the right to rents automatically upon the happening of a specified condition,
such as default."A8 Absolute assignments can have an especially pernicious
impact when the mortgagor files a bankruptcy petition. As one court
reasoned, "When a mortgagee completes all steps necessary to enforce its
rights pre-petition, all interests of the [mortgagor] in the rents are
extinguished and the rents do not become property of the estate or cash
collateral."49 As a practical matter, the mortgagee in this situation will be
able to defeat a reorganization plan or at least dictate its terms.
The foregoing "absolute assignment" approach is an unfortunate
development that has created needless confusion. None of the decided cases
involve an outright sale or transfer of the rents. Indeed, as noted above, the
47. See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. Schwab, 414 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing Pennsylvania
law); First Fid. Bank, N.A. v. Jason Realty, L.P. (In re Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d 423 (3d Cir.
1995); FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1991); Fid. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Williams (In re O'Neill Enters.), 506 F.2d 1242 (4th Cir. 1974); Great W. Life Assurance Co. v.
Rothman (In re Ventura-Louise Props.), 490 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1974); First Fed. Say. of Ark. v.
City Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith, Ark., 87 BR. 565 (W.D. Ark. 1988); In re Gould, 78 B.R. 590 (D.
Idaho 1987); Robin Assocs. v. Metro. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Robin Assocs.), 275 BR. 218, 221
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001) ("[A]n assignment of rents under a document separate and apart from a
mortgage . . . passes title to rents from an assignor's tenants to an assignee as of the execution date
of said assignment document" (citing In re Jason Realty, L.P., 59 F.3d at 427-29)); In re Townside
Partners, Ltd., 125 B.R. 8 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991); In re Galvin, 120 B.R. 767 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990);
Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Ctr. Assocs. (In re Winslow Ctr. Assocs.), 50 BR. 679
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); Great-West Life Assurance Co. v. Raintree Inn, 837 P.2d 267 (Colo. App.
1992); 801 Nolana, Inc. v. RTC Mortgage Trust 1994-S6, 944 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App. 1997). See
generally Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Courts Recognize Lenders' Rents
Interests?, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 833 (1990).
48. Nolana, 944 S.W.2d at 754.
49. Imperial Gardens Liquidating Trust v. Nw. Commons, Inc. (In re Nw. Commons, Inc.), 136
BR. 215, 220 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
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documents in most cases provide that until default, the mortgagor has a
"privilege," or "license," to collect the rents or designates the mortgagor as
the mortgagee's "agent" or "trustee" for purposes of rent collection. The
fact is that the assignment in each instance is intended for security purposes
only and not to make the mortgagee absolute owner of the rents. Some
courts have expressly rejected the casuistry of the "absolute assignment"
theory.so
At the other extreme are states that adhere to what is sometimes referred
to as the "American common law" view of assignments. Under this
approach, an assignment of rents is presumed to create an inchoate security
interest or pledge that is ineffective "until the mortgagee obtains possession
of the property, or impounds the rents, or secures the appointment of a
receiver, or takes some other similar action."" This approach is undesirable
because until the foregoing step is taken, the mortgagee has no lien on the
rents. As a result, such a mortgagee with a previously recorded assignment
will be trumped by a subsequently recorded judgment lien. Moreover, it will
often mean that mortgagee will have an inferior or no claim to the rents if
the mortgagor winds up in bankruptcy.
A significant number of jurisdictions follow a broad "middle ground"
approach that holds that an assignment of rents is effective ("perfected")
upon execution and recording. The right to commence collection of the
rents, however, requires some further action on the part of the mortgagee.52
50. See Lyons v. Fed. Say. Bank (In re Lyons), 193 B.R. 637, 648 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) ("The
fact that the assignments are conditioned upon default and will terminate upon satisfaction of the
debt indicates that they are merely additional security for the loan, and not an absolute transfer of the
[d]ebtors' interest in the rents . . . .").
51. Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981); Galleria Towers, Inc. v. Crump
Warren & Sommer, Inc., 831 P.2d 908, 911 (Colo. App. 1991) ("Until a mortgagor defaults and a
lender takes some 'effectual step' subjecting the assigned rents toward the payment of the debt, for
example, by gaining rightful possession of the property or by filing a foreclosure action, the lender
has only an inchoate right to the rents. This is so even if the terms in a deed of trust grant the lender
the right to receive rents in the event of default. . . . An inchoate interest is an interest in real estate
which is not a present interest, but which may ripen into a vested estate, if it is not barred,
extinguished, or divested."); Comerica Bank-Illinois v. Harris Bank Hinsdale, 673 N.E.2d 380 (Ill.
App. 1996). Texas continues to recognize both "absolute assignments" and the "inchoate lien"
approach. See In re Spears, 352 B.R. 83 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that parties intended
inchoate lien approach); Cadle Co. v. Collin Creek Phase It Assocs., Ltd., 998 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.
App. 1999); Oryx Energy Co. v. Union Nat'1 Bank of Tex., 895 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App. 1995).
52. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.231-
554.232 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.17 (West 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-116
(2008); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Sourlis, 141 B.R. 826 (D.N.J. 1992); Westchase I Assocs. L.P. v.
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. (In re Westchase I Assocs., L.P.), 126 B.R. 692 (W.D.N.C. 1991); N.Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Bremer Towers, 714 F. Supp. 414 (D. Minn. 1989); In re Polo Club Apartments
Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 150 B.R. 840 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993); In re Hall Colttree Assocs., 146 B.R. 675
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992); In re Salem Plaza Assocs., 135 B.R. 753 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(interpreting North Dakota law); In re Coventry Commons Assocs., 134 B.R. 606 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1991); In re Miller, 133 B.R. 882 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991); In re Nw. Commons, Inc., 136
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In some instances, this additional "affirmative action" requirement can be as
nominal as mailing a written demand for the rents to the mortgagor." Other
jurisdictions, however, hold that collection of the rents may begin only after
the mortgagee has satisfied such onerous requirements as taking possession
of the premises or obtaining the appointment of a receiver.54
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages adopts the "middle
ground" approach to security interests in rents." Under the Restatement, an
assignment ("mortgage on rents") becomes "effective" ("perfected") against
the mortgagor upon execution and delivery and, against junior lienors and
other third parties, upon recordation or when they otherwise receive notice
of it.56 In the typical case, the mortgagee's right to take possession of the
rents arises upon mortgagor default and delivery to him or her of a demand
for the rents.s? Delivery of the demand may be accomplished "by personal
service[,] []the United States Mail,. . . [or] any other means reasonably
calculated to afford actual notice" of it." The foregoing provision reflects
an attempt to provide an efficient means for both the creation and
enforcement of a lien on rents. The "middle ground" approach has also been
adopted by statute in California" and by the Uniform Assignment of Rents
Act (UARA), promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (Conference) in 2005.60 This paper later advocates for
BR. at 215; In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); In re 163rd St. Mini Storage, Inc.,
113 B.R. 87 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. P'ship, 117 B.R. 202 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1990); In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 BR. 850 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990); Wilhite Pure Oil
Truck Stop, Inc. v. McCutchen (In re McCutchen), 115 B.R. 126 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990); In re
One Fourth St. N., Ltd., 103 B.R. 320 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Aloma Square, Inc., 85 B.R.
623 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988), af'd, 116 BR. 827 (M.D. Fla. 1990), superseded by statute, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (West 2008), as recognized in Orlando Hyatt Assocs., Ltd. v. FDIC, 629 So.
2d 975 (Fla. App. 1993); United States v. Farrell (In re Fluge), 57 B.R. 451 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985);
Hoelting Enters. v. Trailridge Investors, L.P., 844 P.2d 745 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Okla. Tower Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 798 P.2d 618 (Okl. 1990).
53. See, e.g., In re Nw. Commons, Inc., 136 B.R. at 215; In re 163rd St., 113 B.R. at 87; In re
McCutchen, 115 B.R. at 126; In re Fluge, 57 B.R. at 451.
54. See, e.g., In re Westchase IAssocs., L.P., 126 B.R. at 692; Fin. Ctr. Assocs. of E. Meadow,
L.P. v. TNE Funding Corp. (In re Fin. Ctr. Assocs. of E. Meadow, L.P.), 140 B.R. 829 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Hall Colttree Assocs., 146 B.R. at 675; In re Miller, 133 B.R. at 882; In re
Rancourt, 123 B.R. at 143; In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. at 850.
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2 (1997). The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the Restatement approach as likely to be adopted in Mississippi. See
O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. E B, Inc. (In re Millette), 186 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 1999).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2(b) (1997).
57. Id. § 4.2(c).
58. Id § 4.2(f).
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938 (West 2008).
60. UNIF. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT §§ 1-21, 7 (Pt. IB) U.L.A. 7 (2005); see also infra notes
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congressional adoption of UARA as a means of dealing with the current and
impending crisis in commercial mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.6 1
B. The Impact of the Secondary Market for Mortgages
Even before the current mortgage meltdown and economic crisis, the
argument for greater uniformity in mortgage law had been gathering
strength. Traditionally, the state mortgage law hodgepodge described above
may have been only a minor problem because most lenders, institutional or
otherwise, continued to own the mortgages they originated. However, the
unprecedented expansion of the secondary mortgage market (the purchase of
mortgages from their original holders) over the past several decades made
the argument for uniformity in mortgage law much more compelling. A
variety of government-sponsored institutions-Fannie Mae (formerly
Federal National Mortgage Association), Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Association (Freddie Mac), and Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA)-purchase large blocks of mortgages from local lenders and thus
greatly expand the amount of money available for housing purchases.6 2
These federally-sponsored enterprises (FSEs) finance a portion of their
activity by issuing bonds and equity for sale to the investing public. 63 For
the most part, however, the mortgages they buy are "securitized"-packaged
into mortgage pools to support mortgage-backed securities for sale to
institutional and personal investors worldwide.6 Because the FSEs
195-198 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
62. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING ENTERPRISES: POTENTIAL IMPACTS
OF SEVERING GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP (1996) [hereinafter HOUSING ENTERPRISES], available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96120.pdf. Traditionally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
been the largest secondary market investors of residential mortgages. See Thomas E. Plank,
Regulation and Reform of the Mortgage Market and the Nature of Mortgage Loans, 60 S.C. L. REV.
779, 796-804(2009).
63. HOUSING ENTERPRISES, supra note 62, at 26.
64. These mortgage pools receive the interest and principal payments on the mortgages in the
pools and pass them on to the investor-purchasers. Id. at 16. The secondary market enterprises also
protect investors by guaranteeing this flow of interest and principal. Id. In 2001, 57.6% of all one-
to four-family mortgage loans were sold to the secondary market. FANNIE MAE, A STATISTICAL
SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE FINANCE ACTIVITIES 16 tbl.16 (2002). Indeed, as of 2003, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac alone "either own[ed] or guarantee[ed] nearly half of all home mortgages, and
about 75% of those less than $322,700." Gregory Zuckerman, Finding Answers to Explain Issues
Freddie Mac Faces, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2003, at C3, available at http://bodurtha.georgetown.edu
/FreddieMac/articles/Freddie%20Restatement%2OMay%2oBe%2oBig.htm. Foreign purchase of
mortgage securities is substantial. For example, foreign ownership of Freddie Mac's long-term debt
financing stood at over thirty-three percent as of the end of 2002. See Leland C. Brendsel, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Remarks at Annual Northeast
Regional Conference of Mortgage Bankers Associations (Mar. 19, 2003). At Fannie Mae, foreign
ownership in 2001 of its noncallable benchmark securities was at 32.5%. See Trends in Foreign
Central Bank Activity in Fannie Mae's Debt Securities, FUNDINGNOTES (Fannie Mae, Washington,
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guarantee the payment of the principal and interest on these securities, they
are especially attractive to the investment community.
During this period, a parallel private securitization regime for
commercial loans developed and flourished-that is, those secured by
multifamily apartments, retail and office buildings, and other income-
producing real estate. Beginning in the mid-1980s, these "commercial
mortgage-back securities" grew exponentially and became increasingly
sophisticated. Professor Whitman and I described this commercial
securitization as follows:
The early issues typically took the form of "collateralized
mortgage obligations" or CMOs. Like GNMA-guaranteed
securities, they were backed by pools of mortgages (or in a few
cases, by a single large mortgage loan), but they were not of the
pass-through type. Instead, they typically paid interest
semiannually, but principal payments from the mortgages were
restructured so as to produce several groups of bond-like securities
with varying maturities. For example, a CMO might consist of
three packages of securities, with maturities of approximately 3, 5
and 10 years. All payments of principal on all of the mortgages
would be applied in the early years to retire the first group of bonds,
then to the second group, and so on. The result was a security that
was backed by mortgages but closely resembled an industrial
bond-an instrument which is attractive to some types of investors
who would be disinterested in a pass-through of mortgage
payments ....
During recent years CMBSs have become far more complex than
the early CMOs. They are often issued with large numbers of
specialized classes. The principal and interest payments expected
on the underlying mortgages can be restructured in a variety of
ways, producing, for example, interest-only and principal-only
securities. Some classes may be subordinated to others with respect
D.C.), July/Aug. 2001, at 5 fig.5, available at http://www.fanniemae.com/markets/debt/pdf/
fundingnotes 7_8 Ol.pdf. More recently, the size of the secondary market for mortgages exploded.
See FATEN SABRY & CHUDOZIE OKONGWU, NERA ECON. CONSULTING & AM. SECURITIZATION
FORUM, STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION ON CONSUMERS, INVESTORS, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE CAPITAL MARKETS 16 (2009), available at http://www.americans
ecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASFNERA Report.pdf ("Before the abrupt decline of
securitization volume in 2007, the annual issuance of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) alone has
increased from $259 billion to $2,018 billion between 1990 and 2006, a 678% increase or 13% on an
annually compounded basis. At the end of 2007 there were more than $7 trillion of MBS .... .").
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to priority of payout in the event of mortgage default. Private
mortgage insurance, bank letters of credit, or other facilities may be
called upon to enhance the creditworthiness of some classes. Some
classes may carry adjustable-rate coupons indexed to some external
interest rate, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).
The underlying mortgages may have fixed or adjustable rates.65
The secondary mortgage market has been and continues to be a major
factor in a vibrant national housing and commercial real estate economy.
Notwithstanding being placed in federal conservatorship, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac continue to purchase large quantities of mortgages from
originators.68 This allows capital to flow indirectly into real estate from
investors who would never consider direct mortgage lending.69  It permits
the flow of funds from capital-rich areas of the nation to areas in which a
large amount of real estate investment is needed. It gives mortgage
borrowers access to money at highly competitive interest rates.
However, even before the current economic crisis, "there [was no] doubt
that legal differences from state to state act[ed] as a serious impediment to
the carrying out of these business arrangements." 72  For example, when a
default occurs in a pool mortgage, the speed and efficiency with which the
mortgaged real estate is liquidated depends upon its location. Thus, if the
mortgage is on land in Texas, where foreclosure is nonjudicial and occurs
quickly, 7 1 the money will be returned to the pool promptly and
65. 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 97-98.
66. See, e.g., SABRY & OKONGWU, supra note 64, at 9 n.5.
67. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: ANALYSIS OF
OPTIONS FOR REVISING THE HOUSING ENTERPRISES' LONG-TERM STRUCTURES 7 (2009), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09782.pdf, Jim Puzzanghera, Financial System in Crisis, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at A26; see also infra notes 173-180 and accompanying text.
68. Kevin Kingsbury, Delinquencies Rise Further in Fannie's Portfolio, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090929-707079.html ("Fannie's book of business,
which includes mortgage-backed securities and other guarantees, rose $10 billion to $3.23 trillion.
It's annualized growth rate was 3.7% for August.").
69. See HOUSING ENTERPRISES, supra note 62, at 22 ("Because multiclass securities bring new
investors who wish to avoid unpredictable cash flows into the market, they improve the market's
liquidity and help ensure continuing funding for home mortgages. The new investors that multiclass
securities have attracted include banks, thrifts, pension funds, insurance companies, and other
financial institutions as well as individuals who originate, buy, hold, or sell whole mortgages.").
70. See id at 54 ("It is widely accepted that the enterprises, through portfolio investments and
securitization, have generated many benefits to mortgage borrowers. These benefits include the
reduction of regional disparities in interest rates and mortgage availability, spurring innovations in
mortgage standardization and transaction technology, and lowering of mortgage interest rates.").
71. See id; see also id. at 50 ("Freddie Mac officials also said that .. . any financial benefits flow
to homebuyers in the form of lower mortgage interest rates.").
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES 3 (1997).
73. See Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An Evaluation of State and
Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 229, 266 (1998).
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inexpensively. On the other hand, if the mortgaged real estate is in Kansas,
where foreclosure is by a costly and cumbersome judicial action,74 the cost
to the pool is increased.
State anti-deficiency legislation raises similar issues, at least in the home
mortgage context. For example, relatively affluent Missouri mortgagors
who recently saw the value of their houses drop substantially face the
prospect of a deficiency judgment if foreclosure ensues and the property
yields less than the mortgage obligation.75 Their California counterparts,
however, are immune from such personal liability because of that state's
pervasive anti-deficiency legislation. While these legal disparities
probably have only modest impact on commercial mortgage-backed
securities because many, if not most commercial mortgages traditionally
have been non-recourse by contract, investors in home mortgage securities
may be more inclined to demand higher interest rates and lower loan
amounts in pool mortgages in anti-deficiency jurisdictions.
C. Efforts to Achieve Uniformity
The past nine decades have witnessed numerous efforts to create
national uniformity in mortgage law. First, the Conference promulgated
three acts designed to achieve uniformity in foreclosure law, but none were
adopted by any state. More recently, in 2002, it promulgated the Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (UNFA), which also is finding no acceptance.79
Second, in 1997, the American Law Institute issued the Restatement (Third)
of Property: Mortgages, which seeks to unify a wide variety of mortgage law
and procedure.so Third, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the nation's two
largest secondary market institutions, have published dozens of note and
mortgage forms designed to create mortgage law uniformity by contract.8
Finally, over the past four decades, Congress has enacted legislation on a
74. See id. at 260.
75. Ahmad Safi, Low-Ball Offers Increase in Buyer's Market, St. JOSEPH NEWS-PRESS, Sept. 26,
2009, http://www.stjoenews.net/news/2009/sep/26/low-ball-offers-increase-buyers-market/ (referring
to a twelve percent drop in existing home values in three years).
76. See, e.g., DENNIS L. GREENWALD & MICHAEL ASIMow, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:
REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS § 6:560 (2008).
77. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1407, 1509-10.
78. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
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wide variety of substantive and procedural mortgage law issues.82 These
efforts at uniformity have found only modest success, as the following
material illustrates.
1. The Uniform Laws Approach
While there have been several attempts to achieve mortgage law
uniformity through state legislative adoption of uniform acts, they all have
been singularly unsuccessful. In 1927, the Conference promulgated the
Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act and, in 1940, they proposed the Model
Power of Sale Foreclosure Act.83 Neither of these proposals was adopted by
a single state.84 A similar fate has befallen more recent initiatives by the
Conference to achieve uniformity in state real estate security law, such as the
1985 Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA). Intended to be the real
estate equivalent of U.C.C. Article 9 for personalty, it received a good deal
of scholarly attention and praise. 6 Under ULSIA the preferred foreclosure
method was by power of sale. Only "protected parties" were immune from
deficiency judgments and statutory redemption was abolished for all
mortgagors, protected or otherwise. 8 However, ULSIA proved to be a
dismal political failure; no state adopted it.
In 2002, following four years of drafting, the Conference promulgated
the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (UNFA). 8 9 The UNFA is the
product of years of drafting and reflects the contributions of some of the
82. See infra notes 113-39 and accompanying text.
83. Michael H. Schill, Unformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the
1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261, 1278 (1991);
Jo Anne Bradner, The Secondary Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Real Estate Financing,
36 EMORY L.J. 971, 1001 n.139 (1987); Harold L. Reeve, The New Proposal for a Unform Real
Estate Mortgage Act, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 564, 570 (1938). Moreover, the Central Housing
Committee, a federally sponsored committee, proposed a revised Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act
in 1937 that was equally unsuccessful. See ROBERT H. SKILTON, GOVERNMENT AND THE
MORTGAGE DEBTOR (1929 To 1939) 203-04 (1944).
84. Schill, supra note 83, at 1278.
85. UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT (ULSIA) §§ 101-603 (1985), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ulsia85.pdf. ULSIA was carved out of an
earlier effort of the Commissioners, the Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA), adopted in 1974.
Id prefatory note. It, too, received no adoptions.
86. See, e.g., Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The Future of American Real Estate Law: Uniform
Foreclosure Laws and Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1109 (1996); Norman
Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: The Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 30 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 289 (1995); Curtis J. Berger, ULSIA and the Protected Party: Evolution or Revolution, 24
CONN. L. REv. 971 (1992); Marc B. Friedman, Rentals Roulette: The Mortgagee's Rights to Rent
Under Connecticut Law and ULSIA, 24 CONN. L. REv. 1093 (1992); Roger Bernhardt, ULSIA 's
Remedies on Default- Worth the Effort?, 24 CONN. L. REv. 1001 (1992).
87. See UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT prefatory note & § 509.
88. Id. § 113.
89. UNIF. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT §§ 101-703, 14 U.L.A. 131 (2005).
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nation's leading real estate finance practitioners and scholars. 90  It is
designed to make American foreclosure law uniform by providing for the
prompt and efficient nonjudicial liquidation of real estate collateral while
affording substantial safeguards for defaulting borrowers. Residential
borrowers receive special protection under UNFA. 9'
UNFA represents a major innovation in thinking about the foreclosure
process. Not only does it provide for conventional foreclosure by public
auction sale,92 it also authorizes foreclosure by appraisal.93 Perhaps more
important, it endorses foreclosure by negotiated sale, a process that is
designed to duplicate how real estate is sold outside of the foreclosure
setting.94 "Such a sale will be consummated in much the same way as other
real property sales; the property may be listed with a real estate broker and
advertised extensively." 95  The negotiated sale as an alternative to
conventional foreclosure has long been advocated by land finance scholars
and is designed to produce a higher foreclosure price than the usual auction
sale, a result that would benefit both the borrower and junior lienholders.96
UNFA also rejects statutory redemption-it simply provides that
persons who have redemption rights "may not redeem after the time of
foreclosure." 97 UNFA thus endorses the notion of finality and predictability
in the foreclosure process. While it endorses a fair period for mortgagors to
redeem their real estate after default, it takes the position that this period
ought to run before the date of foreclosure, not after.98
UNFA gives numerous substantial protections to "residential debtors."99
Of the ten or so "residential debtor" distinctions in UNFA, two stand out as
most significant. The first is the exemption from deficiency liability for
residential debtors who have acted in good faith.' 00 The other, believed to be
90. The drafting committee consisted of Carl H. Lisman, Chair, John H. Burton, Lani Liu Ewart,
Dale G. Higer, Reed L. Martineau, Robert L. McCurley, Jr., Lisa Kelly Morgan, Willis E. Sullivan
(who regrettably died before completion of the act), and Dale Whitman, Reporter. Ira Waldman
served as the American Bar Association Advisor and Grant Nelson served as a representative from
the American College of Real Estate Lawyers.
91. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1447-67.
92. UNIF. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT §§ 201-210, 14 U.L.A. 151-66.
93. Id. §§ 501-505, 14 U.L.A. 182-87.
94. Id. §§ 401-405, 14 U.L.A. 176-81.
95. Id. prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 125.
96. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1402.
97. UNIF. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 209, 14 U.L.A. 165.
98. Id. § 202(e), (g), (h), 14 U.L.A. 152.
99. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1447-67.
100. Id at 1489-98.
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unique in American foreclosure law, is the "meeting to object to
foreclosure," a right available only to residential debtors.
There were two underlying reasons for the development by the drafters
of the "meeting to object" concept. The first was the conviction that some
unwarranted foreclosures of residential mortgage loans occur simply
because consumers are unable to establish a clear line of communication
with their lenders.1o' A second factor motivating the drafters was a desire to
create a foreclosure procedure that would withstand an attack based on Due
Process grounds, an issue that is considered in substantial detail later in this
paper.102
Over five years ago, Professor Whitman and I endorsed UNFA as
follows:
UNFA represents an innovative, flexible, and efficient foreclosure
procedure. As such, it should be especially appealing to lenders. At
the same time, however, it carefully assures fairness to borrowers.
Residential debtors are afforded a variety of special safeguards
including substantial grace periods and, if they act responsibly,
immunity from deficiency judgments. In short, UNFA reflects a
careful balancing of the legitimate interests of both lenders and
debtors and represents a major advance in conceptualizing the
foreclosure process.'03
Like its predecessor uniform acts, UNFA unfortunately has found no
acceptance by the states. Indeed, in over seven years since its promulgation
by the Conference, not one state has adopted it.
2. The Restatement Approach
The American Law Institute's recent attempt to achieve uniformity in
the law of mortgages has been marginally more successful. The
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages, promulgated by the Institute in
1997, seeks to "unifly] the law of real property security by identifying and
articulating legal rules that will meet the legitimate needs of the lending
industry while at the same time providing reasonable protection for
borrowers."'" Indeed, in the past several years numerous state courts have
101. Id. at 1450-51.
102. See infra notes 158-92 and accompanying text.
103. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1509. Professor Nelson, however, now has severe
misgivings about the deficiency judgment immunity conferred on residential debtors by UNFA.
Perhaps federal legislation limiting the non-recourse status of home loans is warranted. See infra
notes 239-247 and accompanying text.
104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES 3 (1997).
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adopted various provisions of the Restatement. os But because state court
adoption of Restatement provisions is voluntary, achieving national
uniformity via this route is difficult to achieve and is a painfully slow and
piecemeal process. Moreover, even courts that are willing to follow the
Restatement can do nothing about existing state statutes that impose
inefficiencies and eccentric rules on the foreclosure process.
3. Uniformity Through Contract
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have sought to create mortgage law
uniformity through the law of contract. Both entities promulgate mortgage
and note forms and mandate their use by lenders who wish to sell their
mortgage loans to either of these secondary market enterprises.106 While
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac use distinct forms containing language
uniquely applicable to each state, every form incorporates twenty-one
uniform provisions."0 7 These "Uniform Mortgage and Deed of Trust
Covenants" have undeniably created a great deal of nationwide uniformity in
a variety of substantive mortgage law contexts.'0 For example, these forms
105. See, e.g., Land Holdings (St. Thomas) Ltd. v. Mega Holdings, Inc., No. 1998-078, 1999 WL
1044836 (D. V.I. Nov. 8, 1999) (adopting Restatement section 8.5-merger); Krohn v. Sweetheart
Props., Ltd., 52 P.3d 774 (Ariz. 2002) (adopting Restatement section 8.3-adequacy of foreclosure
price); New Milford Say. Bank v. Jajer, 708 A.2d 1378 (Conn. 1998) (adopting Restatement section
8.6-marshaling); E. Boston Say. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1998) (adopting
Restatement section 7.6(a)-subrogation); Sutton Funding, LLC v. Mueller, 278 S.W.3d 702 (Mo.
App. 2009) (adopting Restatement section 7.2-purchase-money priority); Houston v. Bank of Am.
Fed. Say. Bank, 78 P.3d 71 (Nev. 2003) (adopting Restatement section 7.6-subrogation); Cadle Co.
v. Bourgeois, 821 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003) (adopting Restatement section 5.1, comment I-land
remains encumbered when transferred); Westmark Commercial Mortgage Fund IV v. Teenform
Associates, L.P., 827 A.2d 1154 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2003) (adopting Restatement section 6.2, comment
c-prepayment); Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665 (Wash. 2001) (adopting Restatement section 7.3-
mortgage modification and subrogation). Many other courts have cited provisions of the
Restatement favorably without formally adopting them. See, e.g., In re Smink, 276 B.R. 156 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 2001) (citing Restatement section 2.4-dragnet clauses); Baskurt v. Beal, 101 P.3d 1041
(Alaska 2004); Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 184 P.3d 273 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Restatement section 7.2(b)-purchase-money priority); Bankers Trust Co. v. Collins, 124 S.W.3d
576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Restatement section 7.6-subrogation); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63
S.W.3d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Restatement section 7.3-mortgage modification); Coleman
v. Hoffman, 64 P.3d 65 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Restatement section 4.1-duty of care of a
mortgagee in possession).
106. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND
DEVELOPMENT 1237 (8th ed. 2009).
107. See id. at 1240.
108. See Wilbom v. Bank One Corp., 906 N.E.2d 396, 406 (Ohio 2009) ("[T]hese uniform
mortgage forms are the result of sophisticated parties, all with competing interests and wielding
significant bargaining power, freely entering discussions, compromises, and negotiations for the
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have been highly effective in the casualty insurance context. State default
rules governing whether the lender or the mortgagor controls the disposition
of insurance proceeds after a casualty loss are in substantial conflict.1 09
Absent specific language in the mortgage, many states give the lender the
right to prepay the mortgage obligation with insurance proceeds,"o while
others generally allow the mortgagor to use the proceeds to rebuild unless
the lender's security would be impaired."' The Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac
uniform covenant language mandates that the insurance proceeds "shall be
applied to restoration or repair of the [p]roperty [damaged], if the restoration
or repair is economically feasible and [the] [1]ender's security is not
lessened." 1 2  As a practical matter, because the use of these forms in
residential transactions is pervasive, the foregoing language has become a
national norm.
However, there are clear limits to this contract law approach.
Uniformity can be achieved only to the extent that state law permits lenders
and borrowers to vary state mortgage law by agreement. On most important
questions, such as foreclosure method, deficiency judgments, and statutory
redemption, statutes generally govern and state courts are unwilling to
permit the parties to use form language to avoid the impact of state law.
4. Congressional Intervention
Beginning in the late 1960s, Congress became actively involved in the
issue of mortgage law uniformity. In 1973, the Nixon Administration
proposed the adoption of the Federal Mortgage Foreclosure Act.'13 Under
this far-reaching proposal, foreclosure by power of sale would have been
mandated for any mortgage made, owned, insured, or guaranteed by any
federal instrumentality.1 14 Moreover, it would have invalidated state
purpose of creating 'what the law of mortgages will be in 50 States in most of the home buying
transactions for the next several decades.").
109. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 245-46.
110. See, e.g., Sanroman v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 250 A.D.2d 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); FirstState Bank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 840 P.2d 1267 (Okla. App. 1992); English v. Fischer, 660S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983); 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 245-49.
111. See, e.g., Schooleraft v. Ross, 81 Cal. App. 3d 75 (Ct. App. 1978); Starkman v. Sigmund,
446 A.2d 1249 (N.J. Super Ct. 1982); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.7(b)(1997); 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 245-49.
112. Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Single-Family Security Instrument, Clause 5 (2001), reprinted inNELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 106, at 1246.
113. See S. 2507, 93d Cong. §§ 401-419 (1st Sess. 1973), reprinted in Administration's 1973
Housing Proposals: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93dCong. 483-505 (1973).
114. Id. § 404, 93d Cong. at 487.
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statutory redemption rights.'15 This effort, part of the Housing Act of 1973,
failed to win congressional approval. 116
During this same period, however, Congress enacted federal legislation
focusing on two specific residential borrower consumer issues. The first of
these statutes, the Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968,' 17 mandates that lenders
disclose to home borrowers a wide variety of information including the
amount of the loan, the finance charges stated in terms of "the annual
percentage rate," the payment schedule, delinquency charges, and
prepayment penalties."' The second statute, the Real Estate Settlement and
Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA),l 9 requires lenders in federally-related
mortgage loans to deliver to mortgagors prior to settlement forms detailing
all charges that the mortgagor will incur at the settlement or closing of the
home loan transaction.120 It also regulates the amounts borrowers are
required to pay into mortgage escrow accounts. 12' Finally, RESPA restricts
the payment of fees and "kickbacks" in connection with settlement
services. 122 Neither of these statutes, however, significantly supplants state
law.123
115. Id § 415(d), 93d Cong. at 502.
116. Schill, supra note 83, at 1282.
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (2006).
118. See id § 1638.
119. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 2609. The definition of "federally-related loan" is so broad that it encompasses almost
all home mortgage loan transactions. See id. § 2602(1); Schill, supra note 83, at 1283 n.1 11.
122. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a).
123. Similarly, Congress attempted to deal with "predatory lending" by the enactment in 1994 of
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). See 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1647. HOEPA
imposes numerous requirements on lenders of "high cost" mortgage loans, but is not preemptive of
state law. For an analysis of HOEPA and the practices it prohibits as well as a definition of
"predatory lending," see 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 155-58. As a result of the
mortgage meltdown of the past two years, HOEPA has been strengthened to deal with a wider
variety of mortgage loans. Id. Amendments to Regulation Z, which implements the Act, were
promulgated on July 14, 2008 and will become effective on October 1, 2009. Id They apply to first
mortgage loans with an APR that is three percent higher than the yield on a Treasury security of
comparable maturity or five percent for junior mortgage loans, and they apply to purchase money
loans. Id. They also apply to a wider variety of lender "patterns or practices." Id. Thus, lenders
cannot make a cover loan without considering the borrower's ability to repay the loan from sources
other than the home's value and the lender must verify the borrower's ability to repay. Id They
also restrict prepayment penalties and require an escrow account for taxes and insurance for first
mortgages. Id. Also, in 2008, Congress enacted the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage
Licensing Act (SAFE Act) in part to combat predatory lending; SAFE Act requires all residential
mortgage originators, including mortgage brokers to be licensed and to satisfy certain educational
and financial requirements. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
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In the 1980s, Congress went farther, adopting three statutes that preempt
state mortgage law in a direct and forceful manner. Each statute was the
product of the extremely high interest rates and the crisis that afflicted
savings and loan associations during the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The
first, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act,
effective in 1980, preempted state usury laws for all "federally-related"
loans secured by first liens on residential real estate.124 Interest rate ceilings,
as well as restrictions on discount points and other finance charges, were
covered.125  This legislation was especially aimed at preempting usury
limitations that were enshrined in state constitutions and thus impervious to
legislative change. Second, Congress enacted the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982,126 which makes enforceable the due-on-
sale clause, a pervasively used mortgage provision that enables a lender to
accelerate the debt and foreclose if the real estate is transferred without the
lender's permission. Conflicting state case law and legislation of this period
had created enormous turmoil over due-on-sale enforcement'2 7 and Congress
directly intervened to preempt (with certain minor exceptions) this state law
labyrinth.128
The Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982129 was the
third part of this preemptive effort. It authorized state-chartered financial
institutions to make mortgage loans using alternative formats-such as
adjustable rate, graduated payment, and reverse annuity mortgages-that
were approved by federal regulatory agencies for federally-chartered
lenders, even though such loans would otherwise violate state law. 30 It was
designed to equalize federal and state institutions' powers to experiment
with new mortgage formats. Ironically, several federal decisions have gone
beyond this equal footing principle to hold that all aspects of alternative
mortgages, including features having nothing to do with their "alternative"
character, are preempted from state regulation."'
289, § 2122(a), 122 Stat. 2654, 2837.
124. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7. For regulations issued under this statute, see Preemption of State Usury
Laws, 12 C.F.R. pt. 590 (2009).
125. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7.
126. See id. § 1701j-3. See generally Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Congressional
Preemption of Mortgage Due-on-Sale Law: An Analysis of the Garn-St. Germain Act, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 241 (1983).
127. See 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 476-77, 481-82.
128. Id. at 335-56.
129. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3806. For the applicable regulations, see 12 C.F.R. § 560.220.
130. See 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 134-38.
131. See Nat'l Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n v. Face, 239 F.3d 633 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
Virginia limitation on prepayment charges preempted); Shinn v. Encore Mortgage Servs., Inc., 96 F.
Supp. 2d 419 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that New Jersey limitation of prepayment charges preempted).
Contra Glukowsky v. Equity One, Inc., 821 A.2d 485 (N.J. Super. 2003) (authorizing state-chartered
lenders to impose prepayment charges held to be ultra vires).
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Congress in 1995 considered, but-as was the case in 1973-failed to
enact a comprehensive federal power of sale foreclosure proposal that would
have applied to all federally owned, insured, or guaranteed loans.
Nonetheless, the 1980s and 90s saw the enactment of two less sweeping
federal foreclosure statutes. Each provides for nonjudicial foreclosure of
residential mortgages held by the Housing and Urban Development
Department (HUD). The Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981132
(Multifamily Act) authorizes nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure for
federally insured and certain other mortgages on property other than one- to
four-family dwellings held by the Secretary of HUD. The Single Family
Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994133 (Single Family Act) does the same for
HUD-held mortgages on one- to four-family residences. The two acts are
substantially similar and both preempt state anti-deficiency and statutory
redemption legislation.134  Regulations implementing both acts were
consolidated in one regulation in 1996.131
A nonjudicial procedure employing a power of sale may be utilized
foreclosure under these acts even though the mortgage contains no express
power of sale. After a default occurs and the decision to foreclose is made,
the Secretary of HUD designates a Commissioner to conduct the foreclosure
and sale. Foreclosure is initiated by the service of a Notice of Default and
Foreclosure Sale containing information concerning the property being
foreclosed, the date and place of sale, and related information. 136 This notice
must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks and posted on
the property for at least seven days prior to the sale.13 1 In addition, it must
be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, at least twenty-one days
before the date of foreclosure sale, to the original mortgagor, to those liable
on the mortgage debt, and to the "owner" of the property and, at least ten
days before the sale, to all persons having liens thereon.13 1 On the other
hand, neither the acts nor the regulations require mailed notice to lessees,
holders of easements and others holding interests junior to the mortgage
being foreclosed. Although the acts themselves do not mandate a hearing,
the regulations require one with respect to multifamily foreclosures, "HUD
132. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3717 (1981).
133. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751-3758 (1994).
134. See id. See generally Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The New Federal Foreclosure Laws, 49
OKLA. L. REV. 123 (1996); Stark, supra note 73, at 238-40.
135. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 27.1-27.123 (1996).
136. 12 U.S.C. §@ 3706, 3757 (1981); 24 C.F.R. §§ 27.15, 27.103 (1996).
137. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3708, 3758(3); 24 C.F.R. §§ 27.15, 27.103 (1996).
138. 12 U.S.C. § 3708(1); 24 C.F.R. §§ 27.15(c), 27.103.
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will provide to the mortgagor [and current owner] an opportunity informally
to present reasons why the mortgage should not be foreclosed. Such
opportunity may be provided before or after the designation of the
foreclosure commissioner but before service of the notice of default and
foreclosure."' 39
One should not be tempted to overemphasize the foregoing efforts to
foster uniformity. Mortgage law and especially the rules governing
foreclosure remain largely the province of the states. Local divergence is
still the norm.
D. The Case for Federalizing Mortgage Foreclosure Law
Five years ago Professor Whitman and I observed that "the enormous
impact of mortgage financing on the national economy and the dramatic
growth of the secondary market for mortgages, the current hodgepodge of
state foreclosure law and its attendant inefficiencies make a compelling case
for national uniformity."140  As a result, we advocated congressional
legislation that would confer on most, if not all lenders, in the United States
the option to use UNFA as a nonjudicial foreclosure remedy. We did so
because we characterized UNFA's chances of adoption by the states as "slim
indeed."l41  The failure of even one state to adopt UNFA during this period
and the ensuing economic crisis caused by the mortgage meltdown only
reinforces our view that congressional action is needed.
The empirical argument for uniformity. Our view at that time, however,
was not unanimous. Professor Michael Schill, for example, argued that the
case for uniformity had not yet been convincingly made.142 In his view,
"non-uniform mortgagor protection laws in the context of residential real
estate [are] likely to generate only modest costs., 43  In any event, he
139. 24 C.F.R. § 27.5(b). For an analysis of the acts and post-1994 congressional attempts to
expand their coverage to other federally-held mortgages, see Randolph, supra note 134. While the
Multifamily Act is sometimes used by HUD, see Lisbon Square v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 482
(E.D. Wis. 1994), the Single Family Act currently is not. This is so because HUD may only
foreclose under either act mortgages that it "holds." Single family mortgages are currently rarely
held by HUD because federal law prohibits HUD from taking an assignment of such mortgages for
purposes of forbearance, loss modification and deeds in lieu of foreclosure. See 12 U.S.C. §
1715u(a) (1959). Since it is unlikely that HUD will acquire ownership of a single family mortgage
in other circumstances, the Single Family Act has fallen into disuse.
140. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1509.
14 1. Id.
142. Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 269, 286-87 (1999).
143. Id. at 286. In two earlier articles, Professor Schill found that "the effect of anti-deficiency
laws was statistically insignificant and that an eleven month statutory right of redemption was
associated with an increase in interest of only seven basis points." Id.; see Schill, supra note 83, at
1261; Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489
(1991).
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concluded in 1999: "[E]ven if the laws were costly and inefficient, there [is]
no reason for the federal government to supplant the judgment of the citizens
of states that had [enacted] these laws, at least in the absence of significant
externalities."'"
On the other hand, a 2003 impressive study by Karen Pence for the
Federal Reserve System points to significant externalities.145 Even though
she concludes that statutory redemption laws "do not appear to affect the
mortgage market substantively,"' and her findings about the impact of
deficiency prohibitions are inconclusive, she establishes "a robust inverse
relationship between a judicial foreclosure requirement and mortgage loan
size." 47  Overall, she finds that "defaulter-friendly" foreclosure laws "are
correlated with a four percent to six percent decrease in loan size,"
suggesting that defaulter-friendly foreclosure laws "may assist homeowners
experiencing hard times, but they also impose costs on a much larger pool of
borrowers at the time of loan origination."l 48
We concluded then that Congress should act to create uniformity, but
suggested that congressional adoption of UNFA could take a variety of
forms. The most far-reaching approach would be for Congress to make it
applicable to every mortgage transaction in the United States. Every lender
in the country would then have the option to utilize UNFA as a nonjudicial
foreclosure remedy. Note that this approach would mainly affect only state
foreclosure procedure and would not alter substantive mortgage law. For
example, such a congressional enactment of UNFA would have no impact
144. Schill, supra note 142, at 286-87.
145. See generally Pence, supra note 29.
146. Id. at 27.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1, 28. Other studies had found higher interest rates in defaulter-friendly states. See
Mark Meador, The Effect of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J. ECON. & BUS. 143-48
(1982); Claudia Elaine Wood, The Impact of Mortgage Foreclosure Laws on Secondary Market
Loan Losses (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with Albert R.
Mann Library, Cornell University). In a later version of her paper, Karen Pence concentrates more
heavily on judicial foreclosure and estimates that "loan sizes are 3% to 7% smaller in states that
require judicial foreclosure processes." Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws
and Mortgage Credit, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177, 180 (2006). She concludes that
it seems clear that the mortgage market reaches a different equilibrium in judicial
foreclosure states. In these states, borrowers may pay more for their mortgages, purchase
smaller houses, or have difficulty becoming homeowners. But borrowers are not
necessarily worse off; they may value the insurance provided by the laws.
Homeownership might even increase if the judicial protections help borrowers remain in
their homes. Although judicial requirements seem to impose costs on borrowers, a full
welfare assessment will also require estimates of the law's benefits.
Id at 182.
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on local law governing priorities, subrogation, mortgage modification, future
advances, payment and discharge, and countless other substantive law
issues. A less sweeping approach would be for Congress to make UNFA
applicable simply to the foreclosure of mortgages sold on the secondary
market. An even less dramatic option would entail applying UNFA only to
the foreclosure of mortgages held by federal agencies and the government-
sponsored secondary market entities (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
GNMA). Such an approach would assure secondary market investors that
the time and cost of mortgage foreclosure would not vary by the location of
the mortgaged real estate. 149
Impact of the national economic crisis of 2008-09. The national
economic crisis of the past two years, in large measure caused by the
mortgage meltdown, has, if anything, made the case for congressional action
in the foreclosure arena more compelling. For the federal government, the
crisis has come with a trillion dollar price tag. The cost is breathtaking and
will continue to grow. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are now wards of the
federal government and receiving billions of dollars in federal cash
infusions.so Congress's enactment of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, which contained the Troubled Assets Relief
Program (TARP), provided up to seven hundred billion dollars to enable the
Secretary of Treasury to purchase troubled mortgages and mortgage-backed
securities from financial institutions."' In March 2009, the U.S. Department
of Treasury announced the "Making Home Affordable" program, a seventy-
five billion dollar initiative that is aimed at refinancing and modifying
millions of home loans. 152  The PPIP, a Treasury plan to make private
investors and the government partners in purchasing toxic mortgage-backed
securities from troubled financial institutions, will cost perhaps as much as
five hundred billion dollars. 1 3  As a practical and economic matter, the
federal government has taken ownership of the mortgage crisis.
149. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1510.
150. In early 2009, the federal government allocated more than one hundred billion dollars each
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, "but some analysts have said they may need more." Zachary A.
Goldfarb, Freddie Will Ask for More U.S. Funds, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, at DI. By August
2009, Freddie Mac had received almost fifty-one billion dollars in government aid and Fannie had
drawn down forty-six billion dollars from the federal government. Nick Timiraos, Freddie Turns
Profit, but Issues Caution, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 8, 2009, at A2. On August 6, 2009, Fannie Mae
indicated that the money allocated to it "may not be enough to keep the company out of
receivership." Id.; see also Fannie Mae Seeks Extra $10.7 Billion in U.S. Aid, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2009, at B4.
151. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 101-136, 122 Stat.
3765, 3767-3800.
152. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable: Updated
Detailed Program Description (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/housingfact_sheet.pdf.
153. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Contrast this enormous federal involvement with the strikingly limited
financial response by the states. Few, if any, states have appropriated
significant sums to rewrite mortgages or provide support for lending
institutions. 154 This relative financial inactivity is not surprising, of course,
because with foreclosure, job losses, and the inability to engage in deficit
spending, the state tax base shrinks, and money available for crisis
mitigation is constrained substantially.155
Where there has been intervention by states in the mortgage crisis, it has
largely been regulatory and, in the long run, arguably financially
counterproductive for federal taxpayers. For example, numerous state
legislatures have opted in favor of temporary foreclosure delays or
moratoria.156 To be sure, in the short run, this approach may be desirable
because it may mean less homelessness and other social disruption at the
local level. Ultimately, however, such legislation creates a transfer payment
from lenders to defaulting borrowers in the form of free rent for the
moratoria period. Because the federal government is engaged in a massive
underwriting of lender losses and acquiring ownership of millions of
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, it is ultimately the federal
government that will bear the financial consequences from foreclosure
delay.
154. See State of California Franchise Tax Board, Tax Credit for New Home Purchases,
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/individuals/NewHomeCredit.shtml (last visited June 12, 2009) (describing
a California tax relief program for buyers purchasing a previously unoccupied new home, which
states that California has set aside $100,000,000 for this incentive program).
155. See, e.g., Erica Alini, State Income-Tax Revenues Sink, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2009, at A4
("State income-tax revenues fell 26% in the first four months of 2009 compared to the same period
last year . ... States are required by law to balance the budget, so lower tax revenues will translate in
service cuts, rather than red ink."); Jonathan Weisman, States' Budget Gaps Are Another Test for
Washington, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2009, at A2 ("States face a cumulative shortfall of $230 billion
from this year through 2011 . . . ."); Abby Goodnough, States Turning to Last Resorts in Budget
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, at Al ("With state revenues in a free fall and the economy choked
by the worst recession in 60 years, governors and legislatures are approving program cuts, layoff
and, to a smaller degree, tax increases that were previously unthinkable.").
156. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.52 (West 2009) (stating that a foreclosure sale may not take
place unless it is scheduled ninety days after the expiration of three months from the original notice
of default-provision applies to first liens on an owner-occupied principal place of residence unless
the foreclosure is by a loan servicer licensed by the state to do approved loan modifications); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1502.5 (2009) (stating that after a residential mortgage has been delinquent
for at least thirty days, mortgagor is entitled to a thirty-day grace period for housing counseling prior
to commencement of foreclosure); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304 (McKinney 2009)
(addressing sub-prime and other high cost mortgages in default by entitling mortgagor to a ninety-
day period after default for counseling and modification negotiations before mortgagee may
commence foreclosure).
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In the last analysis there is something surreal about a mortgage
foreclosure system that allows state governments to mandate a foreclosure
regime that places substantial roadblocks and inefficiencies in the path of a
satisfactory federal resolution of the mortgage crisis. To be sure, in the short
run, the state and federal interests in modification of home mortgages are
congruent. In the long run, however, hundreds of thousands of home
mortgages will have to be foreclosed in spite of these good faith mitigation
attempts. It is then that the federal interest will be served by a uniform
foreclosure process, like UNFA, that is both efficient for the government and
fair to borrowers. The snapshot of the Lee County, Florida foreclosure mess
contained in the introduction to this paper may be emblematic of the
situation in hundreds of populous counties in states that mandate judicial
foreclosure.'5 7 It seems bizarre that such states should have the ability to
impose costly procedures on the federal government when the latter is
picking up the tab. Ultimately, however trite or hackneyed it may sound,
one who pays the piper should be able to dictate the tune.
Does Fifth Amendment due process require federal legislation or
regulation? Even if Congress finds the foregoing case for federal enactment
of UNFA unpersuasive, there are constitutional considerations that may
compel some type of federal foreclosure legislation or regulation. As this
paper noted earlier, lenders in the majority of the states foreclose
nonjudicially by power of sale, a foreclosure method that is clearly less time-
consuming and more efficient than its judicial counterpart. However,
assuming that state or federal action is triggered by power of sale
foreclosure, a substantial body of case law has developed in the last three or
four decades, finding that many state power of sale statutes violate the notice
and hearing requirements contained in the Due Process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.' Thus,
those statutes that require only notice to mortgagors or owners by
publication and posting fail to satisfy constitutional standards.'59  Such
persons are entitled to at least mailed notice.'" Moreover, statutes that fail
to provide for notice by mail or personal service to junior lienors are likely
157. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
158. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
159. See I NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 890; Rau v. Cavenaugh, 500 F. Supp. 204
(D.S.D. 1980); Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976), order supplemented 434 F.
Supp. 1251 (1976); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Ga. 1975); Turner v.
Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975). See also Law v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 366 F. Supp.
1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Fed. Land Bank of Columbia v. Lackey, 380 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. Ct. App.
1989). Cf In re Strawberry Commons Apartment Owners Ass'n 1, 356 N.V.2d 401 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984). Contra FDIC v. Morrison, 747 F.2d 610 (1 th Cir. 1984), reh'g denied 763 F.2d 419
(1985).
160. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 890.
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also defective.16' The same constitutional considerations also probably
doom state statutes that provide for notice by mail or personal service both
for the mortgagor and the owner, but for other junior interests only if they
have previously recorded a request to receive it.162 According to one court:
[Such request notice legislation] protects the due process rights of
those parties whose interests and addresses are not "reasonably
ascertainable," by providing a mechanism through which such
parties can be assured that they will receive notice. If an interest of
a party is reasonably ascertainable, however, the minimum
requirements of due process dictate that actual notice be given
without a formal request for notice being filed. 163
Thus, in the latter setting probably the only notice provisions that are clearly
constitutional are those that closely approximate the notice provided to
interested parties under judicial foreclosure: at least notice by mail to all
parties who have a record interest in the foreclosed property junior to the
mortgage being foreclosed. In the last analysis perhaps a finding of
constitutionality is justified only as to this latter type of notice provision.' 6
Most state power of sale statutes make no provision for a hearing for the
mortgagor or other junior interests. This is hardly surprising because their
intent was to avoid the procedural complexities of judicial foreclosure.
Nevertheless, several federal decisions in the 1970s took the position that
power of sale foreclosure violates Fifth Amendment Due Process unless it
requires "a hearing at which [mortgagors] could challenge both the legal
right of [the mortgagee] to foreclose and the propriety of the decision to do
161. Island Fin., Inc. v. Ballman, 607 A.2d 76, 80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). See USX Corp. v.
H.H. Champlin, 992 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that the second mortgagee was entitled to
notice by mail because the junior lien, "even though terminable by foreclosure of the superior loan[,]
was sufficient to trigger due process"); Teschke v. Keller, 650 N.E.2d 1279 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)
(holding that neither junior mortgagee's commercial sophistication nor its ability to protect itself by
periodic checks of the registry records diminished the obligation to provide actual notice of senior
sheriff s sale when the name and address of the junior mortgage were reasonably ascertainable). Cf
Davis Oil Co. v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied 877 F.2d 972 (1989).
162. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 892-93.
163. Ballman, 607 A.2d at 82. See Henderson v. Kingpin Dev. Co., 859 So.2d 122 (La. Ct. App.
2003) ("[The request notice statute] acts as a supplement to notice by publication, allowing
otherwise unascertainable parties to make themselves known. It does not relieve the responsible
state actor in a particular case from exercising the reasonable diligence appropriate in the
circumstances to ascertain, reasonably, the identity of an individual or entity subject to the
deprivation of his or its property. Accordingly, a party with an interest in property does not waive its
due process rights by failing to request notice under [the request notice statute]." (citations omitted)).
164. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 893.
611
so."l65 However, the hearing need not be judicial. As one court stated, a
hearing before a "clerk or a similar neutral official" will suffice. 6 6
Moreover, there is authority that a federal administrative hearing procedure
can be used to supplement state power of sale legislation that itself fails to
satisfy due process hearing requirements.16 7
While both the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments require sufficient
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, it is also fundamental that either
state action (Fourteenth Amendment) or federal action (Fifth Amendment)
must be found before either amendment is applicable. Unless sufficient state
or federal action is found in connection with power of sale foreclosure, a
court will not reach the notice or hearing issues, no matter how deficient a
statute may be in those respects. Interestingly, some of the early power of
sale Fourteenth Amendment cases resolved the constitutional issues without
a consideration of state action.16 However, the issue became increasingly
important, and most of the cases held that state or federal government
statutory authorization of power of sale foreclosure did not entail sufficient
governmental action to trigger the application of constitutional due process
concerns.' 69 This trend is significant because, as a practical matter, it means
165. Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D. Me. 1976), order supplemented 434 F.
Supp. 1251 (1976). See Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Garner v. Tri-
State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Northrip v. Fed. Nat'] Mortgage
Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other grounds 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975);
Valley Dev. at Vail v. Warder, 557 P.2d I 180 (Colo. 1976). Cf Johnson v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
734 F.2d 774 (11th Cir. 1984) (substantial probability Fuentes violated). Contra Guidarelli v.
Lazaretti, 233 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1975).
166. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. at 1259.
167. United States v. Ford, 551 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Miss. 1982). Nor are the notice or hearing
objections readily waived. See I NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 900-03.
168. See Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970); Huggins v. Dement, 187 S.E.2d 412
(N.C. Ct. App. 1972)
169. Pappas v. E. Savings Bank, FSB, 911 A.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that power of sale
foreclosure does not constitute governmental action subject to due process requirements); AgriBank
FCB v. Cross Timbers Ranch, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App.1996); Cheff v. Edwards, 513
N.W.2d 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) ("[F]oreclosure by advertisement is not a judicial action and does
not involve state action for purposes of the Due Process Clause, but rather is based on contract
between the mortgagor and the mortgagee."); Charmicor v. Deaner, 572 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1978);
Barrera v. Sec. Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Northrip v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage
Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975); Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Kenly v. Miracle Props., 412 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Ariz. 1976); Lawson v. Smith, 402 F.
Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Y Aleman Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 414 F. Supp. 93 (D. Guam
1975); Global Indus., Inc. v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Faith Cathedral Church of
God in Christ v. Booker T. Washington Ins. Co., Inc., 481 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1985); Homestead Say. v.
Darmiento, 230 Cal. App. 3d 424 (Ct. App. 1991); Leininger v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, Macon,
481 So.2d 1086 (Miss. 1986); Fed. Nat'1 Mortgage Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. 1975)
(en banc); Wright v. Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Or., Inc., 651 P.2d 1368 (Or. Ct. App. 1982);
Kennebec Inc. v. Bank of the West, 565 P.2d 812 (Wash. 1977); Dennison v. Jack, 304 S.E.2d 300
(W. Va. 1983); Kottcamp v. Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp., 783 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1989). Contra
Island Fin., Inc. v. Ballman, 607 A.2d 76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. at
1250.
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that power of sale statutes continue to provide an effective foreclosure
method for nongovernmental mortgagees even where the statutes are
noticeably deficient on notice or hearing grounds.
However, the above governmental action decisions provide little
comfort to state or federal governmental entities. As Professor Whitman and
I have stated:
Where power of sale constitutional litigation involves a direct
instrumentality of the state or federal government as the mortgagee,
courts cannot avoid the constitutional issues of notice and hearing.
Even though a court would find that a particular state power of sale
statute lacks the requisite state action when a private party is the
mortgagee, the presence of the government as a mortgagee provides
the "governmental action" necessary to reach the constitutional
issues. If the foreclosing mortgagee is a direct instrumentality of
the state, the fourteenth amendment [sic] state action requirement is
readily satisfied. If the foreclosing mortgagee is a direct federal
instrumentality, then the requisite "federal action" exists, and a
court will apply fifth amendment [sic] due process standards to test
the constitutionality of the foreclosure.
It is a relatively common practice for a direct instrumentality of
the federal government to foreclosure under state power of sale
statutes. This situation will arise, for example, where direct loans
made by the Veterans Administration (VA) or the Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA) under various government programs are
foreclosed. It also could occur where the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) opts to take an assignment of an FHA
insured mortgage that is in default and then forecloses.
Normally one would assume that federally-owned corporations
utilizing power of sale foreclosure will be treated as the federal
government for Fifth Amendment purposes.... GNMA[]
presumably, should be similarly treated because it is a corporation
wholly-owned by the United States government that purchases
federally-insured or guaranteed mortgages on the secondary market.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in Warren v. Government National Mortgage Association, held that
GNMA as a foreclosing mortgagee under Missouri power of sale
legislation should not be considered the federal government for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. While the reasoning is unclear,
the court could be saying simply that GNMA, because of its unique
role as a corporation dealing on the secondary mortgage market,
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acts, for the most part, like a private corporation and therefore
should not be treated as a direct federal instrumentality. Indeed, this
view was adopted by a concurring judge. On the other hand, the
opinion can easily be read more broadly for the proposition that
even a direct instrumentality of the United States can foreclose
without "federal action" being triggered so long as the agency
simply follows state power of sale statutes and "neither mandate[s]
nor approve[s] the method of foreclosure to be followed in the event
of default." Finally, perhaps the court was suggesting that even the
United States can act in a proprietary or commercial, as opposed to
governmental, fashion and that foreclosure of mortgages can be
classified as proprietary or commercial activity. If either of these
latter interpretations is accurate and either was to be accepted by
other circuits, then even FmHA, the VA, and HUD could be
deemed nongovernmental and insulated from the requirements of
Fifth Amendment due process. Such a view would surely come as a
surprise to the numerous federal courts that routinely either
expressly find or assume the presence of federal action in federal
agency cases.
[In any event, i]n an important 1995 "federal action" decision,
the United States Supreme Court held 8-1, in Lebron v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., that Amtrak should be treated as the federal
government for First Amendment purposes. In Lebron, a Vice
President of Amtrak had rescinded a contract for a billboard in Penn
Station because the proposed billboard was political in nature.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court held that "where, as here, the
Government creates a corporation by special law, for the
furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself
permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that
corporation, the corporation is part of the Government for purposes
of the First Amendment."
Warren may be dubious authority in light of Lebron. Note that
while Amtrak's preferred stock is wholly owned by the United
States, railroads and other private entities own common shares.
GNMA, on the other hand, is wholly owned by the United States.170
As one analysis states:
If the Lebron test were used to analyze the facts in Warren, for
example, it is likely that the court would reach a different result.
170. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 16, at 911-13, 916 (footnotes omitted).
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The first prong of the test would easily be satisfied by the
declaration of purpose in the statute. As for the second prong, when
Congress partitioned GNMA and FNMA in 1968, GNMA stayed
with the government when FNMA was established as a private
corporation. As part of the government, GNMA is controlled by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Therefore, if the
Lebron test is to be expanded beyond the First Amendment, GNMA
is certain to be considered a federal actor for Fifth Amendment
purposes, thereby invalidating Warren.'7 1
However, according to the foregoing commentator, Lebron did not have
a similar impact on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
Both [Fannie Mae] and [Freddie Mac] will satisfy the first prong of
the [Lebron] test, because they were both formed by the government
to further governmental objectives. The second prong, however, is
probably not met by either [Fannie Mae] or [Freddie Mac]. [Fannie
Mae] is entirely owned by the private sector and has only a minority
of directors appointed by the government. [Freddie Mac] is also
owned by the private sector and also has only a minority of
directors appointed by the government.17 2
In sum, it is fair to say that prior to the summer of 2008, Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae were probably not acting as the federal government when
they foreclosed mortgages under state power of sale legislation.
Impact of the mortgage meltdown on the federal action issue. The
foregoing analysis has probably been rendered obsolete by the mortgage
crisis of the past year and a half and the federal government's reaction to it.
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, signed into law on July
171. Daniel E. Blegen, The Constitutionality of Power of Sale Foreclosures by Federal
Government Entities, 62 Mo. L. REv. 425, 445-46 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
172. Id. In American Bankers Mortgage Corporation v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, the court applied the Lebron test. 75 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). American Bankers
involved a corporation (ABM) that serviced mortgages for Freddie Mac. Id. After an audit
determined that ABM had failed to comply with Freddie Mac's requirements, Freddie Mac
terminated its relationship with ABM. Id. ABM then sued Freddie Mac alleging a violation of its
Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, found no federal action for
Fifth Amendment purposes. Id. Although Freddie Mac qualified under the governmental objectives
prong of the Lebron standard, it failed the "control" prong because the "current governance structure
of Freddie Mac affords the government far less control over that corporation's operations than it had
over Amtrak's operations in Lebron." Id. The court emphasized that the government appointed
fewer than one-third of the Freddie Mac directors, and that Freddie Mac had issued substantially
more stock than Amtrak. Id.
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30, 2008,'7 expanded federal regulatory control over Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac and established the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
for that purpose.17 4  A few weeks later, after the economic condition of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became more precarious, the Secretary of the
Treasury announced on September 7, 2008 that both Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac had been placed under federal conservatorship and that FHFA
was the conservator.175 As conservator, the FHFA assumed the power of the
board of directors and management of both corporations.'76  New CEOs
were appointed who reported to FHFA. 77  In exchange for massive
monetary infusions, senior preferred shares in each corporation were issued
to the federal government with a ten percent coupon.'78 More important, the
government received warrants to obtain stock for a few cents per share.'79 If
the warrants are exercised, the federal government will receive a 79.9%
ownership stake in each corporation. 80
It seems clear that at the present time, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
satisfy the second prong of the Lebron test in that the federal government
controls each entity for the foreseeable future. The upshot is that when
either forecloses mortgages under state power of sale statutes, it is treated as
a federal actor under the Fifth Amendment and therefore must satisfy the
norms of procedural due process. Few state statutes satisfy constitutional
criteria. How then should Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other federal
agencies deal with this issue?
* Should they use only judicial foreclosure to foreclose mortgages? This
option would be a potential disaster for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as
institutions that together hold or guarantee almost half of the outstanding
mortgages in the nation. Simply imagine the Lee County, Florida situation
described earlier in this paper writ large.' 8'
173. 12 U.S.C. § 4501 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
174. Id. § 4511.
175. Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Treasury Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury,Statement on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets
and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpl129.htm.
176. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: FHFA Conservatorship (Sept. 7,2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpl 129.htm.
177. Id.
178. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred Stock
Purchase Program (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
pspafactsheet_090708%20hpl128.pdf.
179. Id See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fannie Mae Warrant to
Purchase Common Stock; Freddie Mac Warrant to Purchase Common Stock (Sept. 7, 2009),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpl I 129.htm.
180. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred Stock
Purchase Program (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/pspa
factsheet_090708%20hp I 128.pdf.
181. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Should they rely on Warren and simply continue to use state power of
sale legislation? Lebron probably precludes this option. 182 Unless federal
courts are willing to hold that whenever a federal agency is foreclosing it is
acting in a proprietary fashion as a normal private market player, reliance on
Warren seems misplaced. On the other hand, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and
other federal agencies surely should refocus on this case as a potential theory
to salvage their use of nonjudicial foreclosure in states that have otherwise
constitutionally defective power of sale foreclosure statutes.
* Should Congress, by legislation, make the UNFA available to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac? This paper recommends that Congress take this
action. UNFA requires mailed notice to all whose property rights are put at
risk by foreclosure.'83 Thus, UNFA clearly meets the notice requirements of
the Fifth Amendment. The hearing issue is less clear-cut. 184 It provides
residential debtors the right to an informal hearing with a responsible
representative of the mortgagee to present reasons why the foreclosure
should not go forward."8 ' There are several potential problems with this
hearing provision, but they all seem remediable. First, the hearing right is
not extended to nonresidential mortgagors or to other junior interest holders
whose interests are prejudiced by foreclosure. 186 Congress can remedy this
by making the hearing right more inclusive to encompass those parties.
Second, the person who conducts the hearing need not be neutral and, as
suggested earlier in this paper, neutrality may be a constitutional
requirement where a federal agency is involved."' However, as Professor
Whitman and I noted in our commentary on UNFA, "[T]here is nothing in
[UNFA] to preclude the use of a neutral person who has no other duties in
connection with the mortgage loan."' 88 In short, with modest amendments to
the UNFA to solve these constitutional issues, its enactment by Congress for
use by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other government agencies would
clearly be desirable.
* Should they request that Congress extend the Multifamily Act and the
Single Family Act'89 to include foreclosures by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and other federal government agencies? Federal policymakers may find the
182. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995).
183. See Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1456-67.
184. See id at 1450-56.
185. See generally UNIF. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT § 206, 14 U.L.A. 162-63 (2005).
186. Id.
187. See Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1452-54.
188. Id. at 1453.
189. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
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UNFA, with its three methods of foreclosure, too complex and too much of a
radical departure from the status quo. Why experiment, they may reason,
when two federal statutes already exist that, with modest changes, are ready
for use by federal agencies? In short, the Multifamily and Single Family
Acts could be combined to foreclose mortgages held by any federal agency.
Nevertheless, several changes will probably be necessary to satisfy
constitutional concerns. Neither the acts nor their regulations require mailed
notice to lessees, easement holders, or others holding interests junior to the
mortgage being foreclosed.' 90 The combined Act would need to be revised
to remedy this due process notice concern. There currently is also a hearing
problem. A regulation under the Multifamily Act currently affords the
mortgagor and current owner an "opportunity informally to present reasons
why the mortgage should not be foreclosed."' 9 ' While one court has found
this hearing provision to suffice constitutionally when the challenge was by
a mortgagor,' 92 neither act currently makes such a hearing available to otherjunior interests prejudiced by foreclosure. A combined Act could contain
language expanding hearing rights to those parties. In sum, this approach is
a viable option for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and other federal agencies.
E. The Case for a Federal Assignment of Rents Statute
Until very recently, the national mortgage crisis has largely been driven
by defaulting single family mortgages. Now the spotlight is beginning to
focus on the commercial real estate market-office buildings, shopping
centers, hotels and apartment buildings. Recently the country has witnessed
substantial defaults in commercial mortgages and commercial mortgage-
backed securities, as well as predictions of greater troubles to come.19 3 As
190. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
191. 24 C.F.R. § 27.5 (2009).
192. See Lisbon Square v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 482, 489 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ("By offering a
mortgagor a chance to explain the failure to make mortgage payments, HUD provides all of the due
process required by the Fifth Amendment.").
193. See Christina S.N. Lewis, Maguire Warns of Loan Defaults, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2009, at
B I ("Maguire Properties, Inc., one of the largest office-building owners in Southern California, is
planning to hand over control of seven buildings with some $1.06 billion in debt to creditors, the
latest sign that rising vacancies and falling rents are causing stress in the commercial real estate
sector."); Francesco Guerrera & Greg Farrell, Property Woes Hit Two Big US Banks, FIN. TIMES,July 23, 2009, at I ("Mr. Bemanke[, Chairman of the Federal Reserve,] warned that a continued
deterioration in commercial property, where prices have fallen by about 35 per cent since the
market's peak and defaults have been rising sharply, would present a 'difficult' challenge for the
economy. . . . [and] one of the main problems was that the market for securities backed by
commercial mortgages had 'completely shut down'."); Lingling Wei & Maurice Tamman,
Commercial Loans Failing at Rapid Pace, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at Cl ("U.S. banks have been
charging off soured commercial mortgages at the fastest pace in nearly 20 years . . . ."); Aline van
Duyn, Worries over Systemic Risk in CMBS, FIN. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at 21 ("If the Fed cannot
unblock the market for securities backed by commercial mortgages, there are concerns that another
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this paper noted earlier, virtually every commercial mortgage transaction
encompasses not only a mortgage on the land and improvements, but also an
assignment of (or security interest in) the rents produced by that real estate.
This paper also described the disarray in the law governing rental
assignments. In 2005 the Conference aptly described the current landscape
and the need for uniformity:
State law generally governs the creation and enforcement of
security interests in rents. Unfortunately, most states do not have
detailed statutory provisions dealing with the creation, perfection,
and enforcement of security interests in rents (by contrast to the
comprehensive provisions in Uniform Commercial Code Article 9
governing the creation, perfection, and enforcement of security
interests in accounts and other personal property payment rights).
Thus, the creation and enforcement of security interests in rents
tends to be governed by the common law of real property. Not
surprisingly, this has produced undesirable variation in the rules
governing the creation and enforcement of security interests in
rents. Perhaps more significantly, disagreements regarding security
wave of losses could be unleashed on the fragile US banking system."); Lingling Wei & Kris
Hudson, Key Investor Stands in Hotel Rubble, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2009, at BI (noting that
monthly default rate for commercial-mortgage-backed securities on hotel properties has risen from
.025% in late 2008 to 2% in June 2009); Annys Shin, Economic Decline Slows in Some Regions,
WASH. POST, June I1, 2009, at A17 ("The decline in commercial real estate, which is just beginning,
drove up vacancy rates for commercial properties in many parts of the country. Developers also
report having an increasingly hard time finding financing for new properties."); Lingling Wei & Kris
Hudson, Relieffor Commercial Real-Estate Debt? It Seems Possible, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009, at
C6 (noting deterioration in the commercial real estate market); Anton Troianovski, Big-City
Skyscraper Burns Ozark Town, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2009, at Al (identifying some consequences of
"today's commercial-property collapse"); Ben Johnson, The Tsunami Effect, NAT'L REAL ESTATE
INVESTOR, May 1, 2009, at 47 ("When Boston's landmark John Hancock Tower sold at auction in
late March for a little more than half of the $1.3 billion that private equity firm Broadway Partners
paid for it only two years earlier, many analysts pointed to the sales price as a new gauge of property
values. But more likely it was the precursor to a tidal wave of commercial real estate foreclosures
and auctions in the coming months."); Edward C. Hagerott, Jr., Curing the Mortgage Loan Blues,
NAT'L REAL ESTATE INVESTOR, May 1, 2009, at 64 ("The signs for commercial real estate are
ominous.... Multiple factors, including tight credit, declining property values and rising vacancy
rates, suggest many borrowers will be unable to refinance or sell their projects for amounts sufficient
to repay maturing loans."); Sibley Fleming, Maturing Loans Head for a Troubled Market, NAT'L
REAL ESTATE INVESTOR, Apr. 1, 2009, at 13 ("A potential recipe for disaster is brewing in the
commercial real estate market, according to a new report from research firm Foresight Analytics.
An extremely tight credit market coupled with $814 billion in maturing loans over the next three
years could prove to be a toxic mix that delays recovery and puts downward pressure on
valuations.").
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interests in rents tend to be resolved in the federal bankruptcy
courts, after the owner of mortgaged real property has resorted to
bankruptcy to obtain a stay from creditor collection efforts.
Bankruptcy courts have proven exceptionally adept at creatively
interpreting (or misinterpreting) state law principles-in some cases
to disencumber a lender's security interest in rents altogether, or in
other cases to exclude post-bankruptcy rents from the bankruptcy
estate. 94
Just as this paper advocates federal foreclosure legislation for both
residential and commercial mortgagees, so too it endorses a similar approach
to assignments of rents. Just as the secondary market in residential
mortgages and the current residential mortgage crisis are driving forces for
greater uniformity in mortgage foreclosure, the expanding secondary market
for commercial mortgages and mortgage-backed securities and the
impending likelihood for substantial delinquencies in that market also
present a compelling case for federalization of rent assignments.
Luckily, for a Congress inclined to create national uniformity in the
assignment of rents context, it need look no further than the UARA
promulgated by the Conference in 2005.'95 Congress could either enact the
UARA and, in doing so, preempt all state assignment of rents law, or it
could simply make it applicable only in bankruptcy proceedings. Of course,
because most litigation concerning assignments arises in the bankruptcy
context, the "bankruptcy only" approach would go a long way to achieve the
desired national uniformity. The UARA provides a superbly drafted and
thoughtful resolution of most of the pressing issues that have confounded
this area of the law. Professor Wilson Freyermuth, the reporter for the
UARA, describes its scope as follows:
[The UARA] provides a comprehensive framework to govern the
creation, perfection, and enforcement of security interests in rents
arising from mortgaged real property. Without such a
comprehensive statutory framework, courts (particularly bankruptcy
courts) have struggled to establish clear and consistent rules
governing security interests in rents-thereby encouraging needless
and wasteful litigation over control of rents arising from mortgaged
real property. Enactment of UARA in each state will provide
much-needed clarity by establishing the following rules:
"Rents" include sums payable for the right to possess or occupy
the real property of another person, even if the occupant does not
technically constitute a "tenant" under real property law.. ..
194. UNIF. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT prefatory note, 7 (Pt. IB) U.L.A. 2 (2005).
195. Id. §§ 1-21, 7 (Pt. IB) U.L.A. 7 (2005).
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A mortgage automatically creates a security interest in rents.
Under the title theory of mortgages, a mortgage automatically
effected an assignment of rents from the mortgaged real property.
Under the lien theory of mortgages, however, a mortgage did not
automatically create an assignment of rents. . . . UARA provides
that an effective mortgage automatically creates a security interest
in rents arising from the mortgaged real property, unless the
mortgage expressly provides otherwise.
A security interest in rents is perfected (and thus enforceable
against creditors and purchasers) upon recording of the document
creating an assignment of rents. Under Article 9, the filing of a
financing statement is sufficient to perfect a security interest in most
forms of personal property. By contrast, some courts have held that
even if a creditor held a recorded assignment of rents, the creditor
held only an "inchoate" lien until the creditor actually collected the
rents after default. Many of these courts further held that if the
debtor filed for bankruptcy before the creditor took effective steps
to collect the rent after default, the creditor's interest was
unperfected and the bankruptcy trustee could set aside the creditor's
interest in rents using the trustee's strong-arm power. UARA
overrules these decisions, providing that the recording of a
document creating an assignment of rents is sufficient to perfect the
creditor's security interest in rents and thereby make that interest
enforceable against subsequent creditors and purchasers.
A security interest in rents is separate and distinct from a
security interest in the underlying real property.. .. Most courts
have treated these rents as a source of collateral that is separate and
distinct from the underlying land. A few notorious bankruptcy
court decisions, however, have held that rents are "subsumed within
the land" such that a debtor need not provide adequate protection of
the assignee's security interest in rents. UARA would overrule
these decisions (to the extent that they rely upon state law),
providing that a security interest in rents is an additional source of
collateral that is distinct from the underlying real estate.
There is no such thing as an "absolute assignment of rents" in
the context of a mortgage transaction; an assignment of rents
creates only a security interest in the rents.. ..
In a mortgage or assignment of rents, a provision granting the
assignee the right to obtain a receiver following the assignor's
default is enforceable. In many states, statutes provide few (if any)
standards to inform a court's exercise of discretion whether to
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appoint a receiver to collect rents from mortgaged real property.
UARA establishes consistent standards to govern the appointment
of a receiver for mortgaged real property. In particular, UARA
establishes the enforceability of a clause by which the assignor has
agreed that the assignee can obtain the appointment of a receiver
after the assignor's default.
Upon default by the assignor (or as otherwise agreed by the
assignor), the assignee may collect all rents that have accrued but
remain unpaid and all rents that accrue thereafter....
The assignee may enforce an assignment of rents by obtaining
the appointment of a receiver, by notification to the assignor, by
notification to the assignor's tenants, or by any other method
permitted by other law. UARA provides specific rules governing
the collection of rents by receivership, by notification to the
assignor, and by notification to tenants....
The assignee's enforcement of its rights and remedies under
UARA does not render the assignee as a "mortgagee in possession"
or trigger other adverse statutory consequences. ... UARA
provides that the assignee's mere exercise of UARA's statutory
remedies does not render the assignee as a mortgagee in possession.
Further, it does not constitute an election of remedies, render the
mortgage debt unenforceable, violate a state's "one-action"
principle, or trigger the application of a state's anti-deficiency
statute.
An assignor that collects rents after it receives notification that
the assignee has enforced its security interest in rents must turn
over to the assignee the rents collected; if the assignor fails to do
so, it is liable to the assignee for the amount not turned over....
UARA provides that the assignor that fails to turn over collected
rents following a proper demand by the assignee is liable to the
assignee for all sums collected by the assignor. Any damages
recovered by the assignee in an action under § 14, however,
constitute security for the mortgage debt and must therefore be
applied to the mortgage debt.
Most tenants that receive notification to make rent payments to
the assignee cannot thereafter discharge their rental obligation by
paying the assignor.... UARA primarily tracks existing common
law, providing that a tenant that receives notification to pay the
assignee can only discharge its obligation by paying the assignee.
UARA does provide an exception for a tenant that occupies the
premises as its primary residence, permitting such a tenant to satisfy
its rental obligation by payment to either the assignee or the
assignor....
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... UARA establishes priority rules that govern disputes between
interests created by real property law (a security interest in the cash
proceeds of rents) and interests in the same property created under
Article 9. A perfected security interest in rents extends to the
identifiable proceeds of those rents-typically, cash collections.
Because cash monies-and the deposit accounts in which cash is
typically maintained-are personal property in which a competing
security interest can be created under Article 9, UARA provides
coordinating priority rules to govern such priority disputes. 196
As this paper describes earlier, there are numerous contentious and
conflicting issues in the law of assignments of rents, due in large part to the
fact that much of this body of law is court-made and state-centric.197 UARA
does a superb job of resolving those issues and, for the first time, organizes
this area of the law into a cohesive whole. Thus far only Nevada and Utah
have enacted UARA. 198  Moreover, if the past is prologue, uniform acts
dealing with real estate have a sad track record for state acceptance. It
simply seems to make sense that an area of the law that is so crucial to the
functioning of our national economy and its bankruptcy courts should
represent a national priority for Congress and the federal government.
F. Is Congressional Adoption of Uniform Acts Inconsistent with the Values
of the Conference?
This paper advocates congressional enactment of two uniform acts-
UNFA and UARA and, in doing so, some may argue that such a course of
action threatens the underlying values of the Conference. To be sure, the
Conference's main raison d'etre since the late nineteenth century has been
to "promote uniformity in the law among the several states on subjects as to
which uniformity is desirable and practicable."' 99 Nevertheless, because
Professor Whitman and I have had substantial involvement with the
196. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents: The New Uniform Assignment of
Rents Act, 71 Mo. L. REV. I app. (2006) (citations omitted).
197. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
198. UNIF. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT, 7 (Pt. 1B) U.L.A. 1 (2009) (indicating that the UARA
was effectively passed by Nevada on May 22, 2007 and Utah on May 12, 2009); see also Utah
Uniform Assignment of Rents Act, ch. 139, 2009 Utah Laws 116 (to be codified at UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 57-26-101 to -119 (West 2009)).
199. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. LAWS, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 1.2,
available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=18.
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Conference,2 oo we can attest to the fact that, "however desirable the goal of
uniformity, it is secondary to a more compelling concern-the threat of
federal preemption."20' The Conference commonly argues that "unless we
act, Congress will do it for us." 20 2 This view seems to reflect an underlying
federalist ideology, dictating that uniformity should only be achieved by the
individual assent of each of the several states.203
As a practical matter, why should this always be the case? At least as to
commercial issues, if uniformity is so important, why not let Congress do it?
After all, with the exception of such major projects as the Uniform
Commercial Code, uniform acts are rarely adopted by all of the states.2 04
Even well-received products such as the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, and the Uniform Probate Code have
failed to achieve unanimous adoption.205 Thus, the promulgation of most so-
called "uniform" acts fails to achieve the desired uniformity. 206
Professor Whitman and I argued in 2005 that perhaps it's time for the
Conference to adopt a new perspective.207 A strong case can be made that
uniform acts dealing with commercial transactions ought to be enacted by
Congress under its Commerce Clause power.208 Under this approach, future
versions of the U.C.C. would be enacted by Congress. So too would be the
UNFA. Only acts dealing primarily with local social and cultural concerns,
such as the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and the Uniform Probate
Code, would continue to be produced for adoption by state legislatures.209
This "bifurcated function" approach for the Conference is hardly a
radical suggestion. Uniform acts undergo a time-consuming, deliberate,
multi-draft process that generally takes at least three or four years, and the
result is almost always a high quality product-often higher in quality than
typical acts of Congress.21 o State influence on uniform acts is substantial.
They are drafted and considered by a body that is largely supported
200. Grant Nelson was a Commissioner from Missouri from 1982-1991 and Dale Whitman
served as Reporter for UNFA from 1997-2002.
201. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1512.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act has been adopted by forty-three states and the District
of Columbia, the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act by forty-eight states, the District of Columbia
and the Virgin Islands and the Uniform Probate Code by eighteen states. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT, 7A (Pt. II) U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 2009); UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT, 8C
U.L.A. 1-2 (Supp. 2009); UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 (Pt. II) U.L.A. I (Supp. 2009). Even the
Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by all of the states, is not totally uniform.
206. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1512.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1512-13.
210. Id
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21
financially by state governments. Perhaps more important, the
membership of the Conference is comprised of leading lawyers, judges and
academics who are appointed by the political process in each of the states. 21 2
Indeed, uniform acts probably receive much more local and state input than
the usual legislation enacted by Congress. Consequently, if uniformity in
commercial matters is desirable, why not let it come in the form of a
congressionally enacted uniform act produced by the Conference's careful
deliberative process that reflects state concerns in a substantial manner? If
the Conference and Congress adopted this approach, the Conference could
achieve an impact in the new millennium that would far exceed its influence
on the development of the law in the past century.213
G. Does Congress Have the Power to Enact UNFA and UARA?
Professor Whitman and I concluded then that congressional adoption of
UNFA in any of the above variants clearly would survive a Commerce
Clause challenge. Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, Congress
can reach "those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."214
To be sure, unlike the UCC, which focuses on the sale and
mortgaging of moveable property, [UNFA] deals with [real estate],
which, by its very nature, remains in one place. Nevertheless, under
the Court's current approach, even though an isolated local
mortgage foreclosure may not substantially affect commerce in
more than one state, a rational Congress surely could conclude that
211. Uniform Law Commissioners, Financial Support, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
aboutus.asp#financial (last visited Oct. 26, 2009) ("The major portion of financial support for the
Conference comes from state appropriations. Expenses are apportioned among the states by means
of an assessment based on population.").
212. While the method of appointment of commissioners to the Conference varies among the
states, three patterns are discernable. In some states, they are appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the senate. In other states, the sole appointing authority is the legislature. In a third
approach, some states give both the governor and the legislature the exclusive authority to appoint a
fixed number of commissioners. Telephone Interview with John M. McCabe, Legislative Dir. and
Legal Counsel, Nat'1 Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws (June 4, 2002).
213. Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 26, at 1513.
214. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). See also Grant S. Nelson & Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal
Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4-5, 168
(1999); Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause Standard for the New Millennium: "Yes" to Broad
Congressional Control over Commercial Transactions; "No" to Federal Legislation on Social and
Cultural Issues. 55 ARK. L. REv. 1213, 1248 (2003).
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the cumulative impact of such transactions on the national mortgage
market does so.215
If anything, the UARA presents an even stronger case for congressional
Commerce Clause power. Rents from real estate, while treated as real
216estate, nevertheless represent money and, therefore, are portable and
pervasively cross state lines. Because rent assignments in commercial
transactions occur nationwide, there is little doubt that the cumulative impact
of these assignments substantially affects commerce in more than one state.
In any event, there is no doubt that Congress can use its bankruptcy power to
make UARA applicable in bankruptcy courts.217
H. The Retroactivity Question
This paper advocates congressional enactment of UNFA and UARA and
application of those acts to all mortgage transactions in the United States. 2 18
Assuming Congress is unwilling to take such an all-encompassing course of
action, this paper suggests that there are a variety of less pervasive
approaches available to it. Thus, Congress could choose to limit UNFA to
federal agencies only 2 19  and to make UARA applicable only in
bankruptcy.220 An even more limited approach would be to extend the
current federal Multifamily and Single Family Acts to all federally-held
mortgages. 221
Should it choose any of the foregoing options, Congress should state its
intention to make its action applicable to all mortgages in existence at the
time of enactment. The beneficial impact of such federal legislation on the
current mortgage crisis will be substantially lost unless it can be applied to
the hundreds of thousands of mortgages that are currently in default and will
inevitably be foreclosed. After all, for many mortgagors, modifications will
ultimately fail and for many others, their situations will be too hopeless to
justify a modification agreement in the first place. Indeed, Congress needs
215. Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 214, at 168.
216. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. The treatment of rents as real estate has been
subject to substantial criticism. See, e.g., R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and
Formalism in the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications for Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance,
40 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (1993) (suggesting that rents when pledged as security in commercial real
estate transactions be treated as personalty, with liens upon such income being governed by Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code). Professor Wilson Freyermuth, in a superb 1993 article,
advocated that rents be treated as personalty for security purposes. Id. at 1467, 1536-42.
217. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power to establish uniform laws of
bankruptcy).
218. See supra notes 149-91, 193-98 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
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to be specific on the retroactivity issue, because the Supreme Court has
made it clear that "the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply
rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older
than our Republic."222
Assuming Congress opts in favor of retroactivity, will such a course of
action be constitutional? This question requires analysis of the degree to
which new federal foreclosure legislation upsets the prior expectations of the
parties. For mortgagees, whether private or governmental, there is almost no
prejudice caused by retroactivity. In judicial foreclosure states, enacting
federal power of sale foreclosure will significantly benefit mortgagees
because the cost and delay of judicial foreclosure will be obviated. In power
of sale states, federal legislation will have little impact on private
mortgagees, because there will be minimal change in the status quo.
Moreover, for federal mortgagees, legislation that is modified to correct due
process notice and hearing problems will enhance their ability to use
nonjudicial foreclosure where the status quo raises difficult constitutional
questions.
For mortgagors, the impact of retroactivity is more profound. To be
sure, in power of sale states, substituting one form of power of sale
foreclosure for another will generally result in little prejudice. For many
mortgagors in states that have relatively summary nonjudicial foreclosure,
new federal legislation of the types described above probably expands rather
than contracts mortgagor rights. The major retroactivity issue arises in
almost forty percent of the states where judicial foreclosure must be used.
All of the proposals considered in this paper, if applied retroactively, would
deprive a mortgagor of a right to a judicial proceeding that was guaranteed
by state law at the time the mortgage was executed.
When states enact retroactive commercial legislation, they are
constrained by the Contract Clause that mandates that "[n]o state shall ...
pass any . .. [f]aw impairing the [o]bligation of [c]ontracts." 223 However,
the foregoing provision restricts only the states, and protection against
impairment and retroactivity against the federal government must be found
in the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.224 Moreover, the Fifth
Amendment due process restrictions are not coextensive with prohibitions
on state regulations imposed by the contract clause.
222. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994); see also CFCU Cmty. Credit Union
v. Hayward, 552 F.3d 253, 262 (2nd Cir. 2009).
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
224. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 487 (7th Ed. 2004);
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 629 (3d ed. 2006).
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To the extent that federal legislation proposed by this paper deals with
private mortgagees, the standard of due process review is strongly
deferential to Congress. As the Supreme Court stated in 1984:
Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by
a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means,judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the
exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches ....
[R]etroactive legislation does have to meet a burden not faced by
legislation that has only future effects. . . . But that burden is met
simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation
is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.225
Applying federal foreclosure legislation retroactively to existing
privately-held mortgages should be easy to justify under the foregoing
standard. Clearly, even though there may be successful modifications of
thousands of mortgages, many of those mitigation attempts will fail and the
situation of numerous other mortgagors will be too hopeless to justify
modification.22 6 Ultimately the backlog will mean the foreclosure of
hundreds of thousands of mortgages. Enactment of an efficient and fair
mechanism for foreclosure of those remaining mortgages surely is a rational
congressional action in attempting to bring the current economic crisis to a
successful conclusion. A similar analysis would justify retroactive
application of federal enactment of the UARA or other assignment of rents
legislation. If, as seems likely, defaults in commercial mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities create a flood of new Chapter 11 bankruptcy
filings of debtors with buildings in more than one state, one uniform rule
governing security interests in rents will substantially facilitate efficient
bankruptcy reorganizations.
However, a higher standard of review will be applied to acts of
Congress that retroactively modify the government's own contracts than to
federal legislation that has a retroactive impact on private contracts.227 In the
latter situation, courts will "require more than a rational relationship between
the modifying statutes and a governmental purpose before it will sustain the
measure." 228 Indeed, in a significant Contracts Clause case involving a state
interference with its own contract, the Supreme Court stated:
225. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray and Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984).
226. See Robin Sidel, Loan Redos Get Tangled in Thicket of Red Tape, WALL ST. J., June 17,
2009, at Al ("[A]bout four million [home] loans[] were delinquent in the first quarter of 2009 ...
[and] just 518,155 home loans had been modified. . .
227. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 224, at 494.
228. Id.
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As with laws impairing the obligation of private contracts, an
impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary
to serve an important public purpose. In applying this standard,
however, complete deference to a legislative assessment of
reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State's
self-interest is at stake.229
At least one commentator has suggested that this standard should apply
to federal attempts to modify its own contractual obligations.230 Thus, for
example, it is arguable that to apply federal nonjudicial foreclosure
legislation to a mortgagor who otherwise would have a right to judicial
foreclosure under state law requires a serious judicial examination of the
legislation's reasonableness and necessity.
There are several responses to this argument. First, where the original
mortgage transaction is between a mortgagor and a private lender, but the
note and mortgage is subsequently assigned to the federal government, it is
plausible that a simple rational basis standard of review of retroactivity may
be justified because the original transaction was private. In one case where
state law otherwise required judicial foreclosure, the mortgagor challenged
on Fifth Amendment due process grounds the retroactive application of the
federal Multifamily Act to a note and mortgage that had been assigned from
the original mortgagee to the federal government. 23' The court rejected this
challenge, albeit without mentioning the fact the government was an
assignee of the mortgage:
Congressional legislation "adjusting the burdens and benefits of
economic life" is presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the
complaining party to establish that the legislation is arbitrary and
irrational. This applies to the retroactive application of a statute as
well as long as it is "supported by a legitimate legislative purpose
furthered by a rational means." This is so even if the legislature's
readjusting of rights and burdens "upsets otherwise settled
expectations." Moreover, contractual arrangements, including those
to which the United States is a party, remain subject to subsequent
legislation.232
229. U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1977).
230. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 224, at 495 n.46.
231. Lisbon Square v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 482, 490 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
232. Id (citations omitted).
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Another argument for sustaining retroactivity under a limited scope of
review is that the federal foreclosure legislation advocated by this paper is
based on a "right-remedy" distinction. For example, a famous depression-
era Contract Clause case sustained Minnesota legislation that authorized
state courts to extend the post-foreclosure redemption period. As one
commentator has described this decision, "[T]he state could alter remedies
for debts if the legislation reasonably related to a public purpose and
protected the basic value of creditor claims; the states were not permitted to
significantly impair the basis of creditors' accrued rights in order to improve
the economic position of debtors."234 None of the federal foreclosure
legislation proposed by this paper changes the substantive rights of the
parties under the debt obligation-rather, it makes foreclosure (the remedy
after default) occur earlier than under state judicial foreclosure procedure.
Of course, the depression case dealt with pro-debtor legislation while the
legislation considered in this paper often strengthens mortgagee remedies
and courts may therefore be less sympathetic to the "right-remedy"
distinction when it benefits creditors rather than debtors.
An "emergency" situation also sometimes justifies judicial deference for
federal retroactive legislation where the federal government is a party. For
example, the Supreme Court upheld on a due process challenge World War
II legislation that allowed the federal government to renegotiate any pre-war
contract it had with private parties to prevent conferring excessive profits on
those parties. 235 The Court deferred to the judgment of Congress on the need
to prevent wartime profiteering.236 Given the flood of foreclosures that have
and will occur during an economic crisis that is the most severe since the
Great Depression of the 1930s, it is hardly unjustified to characterize the
current foreclosure crisis as an "emergency." Thus, if Congress decides to
enact any of the federal foreclosure legislation proposed by this paper and to
make it retroactive, it would be advisable for it to include a preamble that
emergency conditions justify acting retroactively.
In the last analysis, even if courts were to reject the foregoing arguments
for a relaxed standard of review for federal foreclosure legislation being
applied retroactively, there still is a significant likelihood that such
legislation can be sustained under a heavier burden of proof. Surely, once
the federal government is satisfied that modification efforts have run their
course, there is a strong governmental interest in the efficient foreclosure of
federally-held defaulted mortgages and the return of the underlying real
estate into the marketplace. If judicial foreclosure is necessary for such
233. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
234. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 224, at 479.
235. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
236. Id.
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mortgages, the cost to the federal taxpayers will be enormous. This is
especially the case if all mortgages now held by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
are subject to constitutional notice and hearing requirements considered
earlier in this paper.237 If so, unless new federal power of sale legislation is
validly retroactive, all federal foreclosures of existing mortgages may have
to be judicial. Even worse, if judicial foreclosure is the only option, the
federal government may be prohibited from hiring local attorneys to
represent it. This is because under current law, when the federal government
forecloses judicially, it must be represented by the United States Attorney.
Thus, even though the retroactive application of federal foreclosure
legislation will deprive some mortgagors of time in possession of their real
estate fostered by state law, that interest in continued possession is surely
outweighed by the federal government's enormous interest in liquidating
billions of dollars worth of real estate and putting it back into the stream of
commerce.
Finally, even if, in the worst case scenario, retroactivity cannot
constitutionally be achieved for federally-held mortgages, a partial solution
may be available to Congress. It could amend existing mortgage
modification legislation so that future modifications are conditioned upon
mortgagors' agreement that future foreclosures will be under federal
foreclosure statutes. The willingness of mortgagees to agree to
modifications should be sufficient consideration for mortgagors' agreement
that any future foreclosure be under federal legislation.
Of course, even if retroactivity is impossible, it is still desirable that
Congress federalize mortgage foreclosure and assignment of rents law for
future application. In the event of another national real estate crisis or
meltdown, legislation will be in place to deal with the problem with
efficiency and fairness.
L An Aside: Federal Preemption of State Anti-Deficiency Legislation
Although not a primary focus of this paper, another potential candidate
for federal preemption are state laws prohibiting deficiency judgments
against mortgagors after foreclosure. Indeed, in over twenty percent of the
237. See supra notes 158-92 and accompanying text.
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of
the Attorney General."). Of course, Congress could enact legislation permitting Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to hire its own outside counsel.
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states, including such major jurisdictions as California, Arizona and North
Carolina, most home mortgages are, as a practical matter, non-recourse-the
defaulting mortgagor is simply not personally liable on the mortgage debt.2 39
A June 2009 paper by Professor Luigi Zingales and others found that
twenty-six percent of current mortgage defaults are by homeowners who
choose to default even though they could afford to continue paying on their
loans. 240 Because their homes were worth less than their mortgage debts,
they made "strategic" decisions to walk away from their obligations.24'
Another recent commentator argues that "by far, the most important factor
related to foreclosures is the extent to which the homeowner now has or ever
had positive equity in a home." 242 Moreover, a convincing 2009 empirical
study by Andra Ghent and Marianna Kudlyak makes a strong case that
"recourse decreases the probability of default when there is a substantial
likelihood that a borrower has negative home equity."243 While they are
unable to conclude that personal liability deters default in mortgages held by
government agencies, they find a robust correlation between recourse and
default as to privately-held mortgages:
Our model predicts that we do not need to actually observe
lenders frequently pursuing deficiency judgments to conclude that
recourse alters borrowers' behavior. The threat of a deficiencyjudgment deters would-be strategic defaulters under many
combinations of negative equity and the degree of lender's recourse.
In other situations, if the borrower does default, allowing lenders to
pursue a deficiency judgment changes how borrowers default. In
particular, in states that allow lenders recourse, default occurs more
frequently by deeds in lieu [of foreclosure] and short sales as
recourse gives lenders a better negotiating position.
Empirically, we find that, at the mean value of the default option
at the time of default, the probability of default is 20% higher in
non-recourse states than in recourse states. The deterrent effect on
default is significant only for borrowers with appraised property
values of $200,000 or more. At the mean value of the default
option at the time of default and for homes appraised at $300,000 to$500,000, borrowers in non-recourse states are 59% more likely to
default than borrowers in recourse states. For homes appraised at$500,000 to $750,000, borrowers in non-recourse states are almost
239. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
240. Luigi Guiso et al., Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages 10 (Nat'1
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15145, 2009).
241. Id.
242. Stan Liebowitz, New Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2009, at A13.
243. Ghent & Kudlyak, supra note 26, at 1.
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twice as likely to default as borrowers in recourse states while for
homes appraised at $750,000 to $1 million, borrowers in non-
recourse states are 66% more likely to default. 244
The upshot seems to be that "[m]any defaults could be mitigated if
homeowners with financial resources know they can't just walk away." 245
At a time when federal taxpayers are picking up the tab for billions of
dollars of defaulted mortgages, is it sound national policy to permit
mortgagors of means to avoid liability in states such as California, when
their counterparts in other states are prohibited from doing so?246 In any
event, federal legislation preempting or limiting state anti-deficiency
protections is surely worth serious consideration.247
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued for federal preemption of state procedures
governing the foreclosure of mortgages and security interests in rents.
While it also suggests that federal action limiting or prohibiting state anti-
deficiency legislation may be appropriate, it leaves this issue to future
consideration. Thus, its major focus is to advocate the congressional
adoption of both UNFA and UARA to make them available to all lenders
nationwide. 24 8  However, the federal government has a special stake in
244. Id at 29. In view of the fact that UNFA bars deficiency judgments against most residential
debtors, if Congress chooses to adopt this Act, it arguably should be amended to authorize
deficiency liability for those debtors. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
245. Liebowitz, supra note 242, at A13. One scholar suggests, however, that more borrowers
should be "walking away" from underwater loans and that "it is time to put to rest the assumption
that a borrower who exercises the option to default is somehow immoral or irresponsible." Brent T.
White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the
Housing Crisis 7, 52 (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 09-35, 2009), available at
http://www.sacbee.com/static/weblogs/real-estate/SSRN-idl
4 94 4 6 7 .pdf.
246. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
247. See Liebowitz, supra note 242, at A13; see also Martin Feldstein, How to Save an
'Underwater' Mortgage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2009, at A 13 (advocating a plan of modification of
existing mortgages in default, but advocating federal legislation to impose personal liability on
mortgagors who accept a modification). Of course, applying any federal preemption approach to
existing mortgages would probably violate due process retroactivity norms because its impact in
creating personal liability where none existed previously would alter substantive, rather than
procedural, rights of mortgagors. See supra notes 218-38 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, this obstacle would not bar federal preemptive legislation that is prospective only. Nor would
it be a problem if the legislation is applied to existing mortgages where a borrower accepts a loan
modification. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
248. While beyond the purview of this paper, there is another mortgage law area of state law that
may also be suitable for congressional preemption. The law of equitable subrogation as applied to
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greater uniformity for its own account. This is especially the case as to
mortgages on real estate. The fallout of the economic crisis of the past year
and a half has made it the owner or guarantor of millions of mortgages. It
will be confronted with an overwhelming number of foreclosures that will
survive all attempts at modification. Given the fact that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are now wards of the federal government, the federal stake in
efficient and fair foreclosure procedures has become compelling. Forcing
the federal government to foreclose possibly hundreds of thousands of
mortgages judicially in many states seems almost surreal. Given the
enormous cost of this crisis to the federal taxpayers, the government should
not be held hostage to arcane and outmoded foreclosure procedures. Even in
nonjudicial foreclosure states, the federalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac probably necessitates changes in some statutes to comply with
constitutional due process mandates. At the very minimum, the federal
Single Family and Multifamily Acts with minor modifications should be
made available to all federal agencies.
mortgage refinancing represents another important example of how state law is far from uniform and
how this absence of uniformity significantly increases the cost of mortgage refinancing. See Grant
S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Adopting Restatement Mortgage Subrogation Principles: Saving
Billions of Dollars for Refinancing Homeowners, 2006 BRIG. Y. L. REv. 305 (2006). In the typical
mortgage refinancing the mortgagor requests the refinancing lender to pay off the prior mortgage
loan-commonly a first mortgage. In conventional thinking, this discharges the prior mortgage,leaving the refinancing lender's mortgage as the new first mortgage. Of course, this result follows if
there are no intervening liens or other interests in the land sandwiched in priority between the old
and new mortgages. The reason the refinancing lender usually orders a title examination and a new
title insurance policy (paid for by the mortgagor) is to ensure that no such intervening interests exist.
Id at 305. If intervening interests exist, the refinancing lender is concerned that, when the prior
mortgage is paid, these interests will be promoted in priority, and will trump the refinancing
mortgage. If the old mortgage can be assigned by operation of law to the refinancing lender (and the
latter be treated as "subrogated" to old lender) intervening liens or other interests are far less
threatening to the refinancing lender. In such a scenario, those liens will remain subordinate to the
refinanced mortgage because the refinancing mortgagee will "inherit" or be subrogated to the
mortgage being paid off. The more a refinancing lender can be subrogated to the loan being
refinanced, the less likely a preexisting junior lienholder can claim a windfall of advanced priority.
Id. Currently, the law in many states gives insufficient protection to the refinancing lender. Should
Congress choose to preempt state law to give maximum protection to that lender, title insurance
premiums paid by refinancing mortgagors should be substantially reduced and refinancing by
homeowners at lower current market interest rates will be encouraged. Id. at 366 ("In such an
environment [federal legislation] we believe that title insurers would either substantially reduce
premiums . . . or run the risk that major institutional lenders would eliminate the need for title
insurance completely .... Either way, American homeowners would be the major beneficiaries.").
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